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An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law
Robert H. Sitkoff

Abstract

This Article develops an agency costs theory of the law of private trusts, focusing
chiefly on donative trusts. The agency costs approach offers fresh insights into
recurring problems in trust law including, among others, modification and termination, settlor standing, fiduciary litigation, trust-investment law and the duty of
impartiality, trustee removal, the role of so-called trust protectors, and spendthrift
trusts. The normative claim is that the law should minimize the agency costs inherent in locating managerial authority with the trustee and the residual claim with
the beneficiaries, but only to the extent that doing so is consistent with the ex ante
instructions of the settlor. Accordingly, the use of the private trust triggers a temporal agency problem (whether the trustee will remain loyal to the settlor’s original wishes) in addition to the usual agency problem that arises when risk-bearing
and management are separated (whether the trustee/manager will act in the best
interests of the beneficiaries/residual claimants). The positive claim is that, at least
with respect to traditional doctrines, the law conforms to the suggested normative
approach. This Article draws on the economics of the principal-agent problem
and the theory of the firm, and it engages the ongoing debate about whether trust
law is closer to property law or contract law. Although the analysis focuses on
donative trusts, it should be amenable to extension in future work to commercial
and charitable trusts.
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This Article develops an agency costs theory of the law of private trusts,
focusing chiefly on donative trusts. The agency costs approach offers fresh
insights into recurring problems in trust law including, among others, modification and termination, settlor standing, fiduciary litigation, trust-investment law and the duty of impartiality, trustee removal, the role of so-called
trust protectors, and spendthrift trusts. The normative claim is that the law
should minimize the agency costs inherent in locating managerial authority
with the trustee and the residual claim with the beneficiaries, but only to the
extent that doing so is consistent with the ex ante instructions of the settlor.
Accordingly, the use of the private trust triggers a temporal agency problem
(whether the trustee will remain loyal to the settlor’s original wishes) in addition to the usual agency problem that arises when risk-bearing and management are separated (whether the trustee/manager will act in the best interests
of the beneficiaries/residual claimants). The positive claim is that, at least
with respect to traditional doctrines, the law conforms to the suggested normative approach. This Article draws on the economics of the principal-agent
problem and the theory of the firm, and it engages the ongoing debate about
whether trust law is closer to property law or contract law. Although the
analysis focuses on donative trusts, it should be amenable to extension in
future work to commercial and charitable trusts.
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INTRODUCTION
Agency cost theories of the firm dominate the modern literature
of corporate law and economics.1 Meanwhile, the private express
trust, an entity from which the corporation traces its roots,2 has been
left largely untouched by agency cost analysis.3 Yet, in an echo of
Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means’s famous critique of the corporation’s “separation of ownership and control,”4 the central feature of
the private trust is that it “separate[s] the benefits of ownership from
the burdens of ownership.”5 This implies that many of the analytical
tools supplied by the agency cost theories of the firm, which are routinely applied in the economic analysis of corporate law, should be
similarly applicable to the underdeveloped economic analysis of trust
law.6 Indeed, problems of shirking and monitoring, the driving concerns of agency cost analysis, abound in trust administration. Accordingly, this Article develops an agency costs theory of trust law as
organizational law, here focusing on donative private trusts. The anal1
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); see also Armen A. Alchian &
Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV.
777 (1972); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288
(1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 327 (1983) [hereinafter Fama & Jensen, Residual Claims]; Eugene F. Fama &
Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983) [hereinafter Fama & Jensen, Separation]; Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1395–1774 (1989). See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW
AND ECONOMICS § 1.5, at 26–38 (2002) (discussing various economic models of business
organizations). For the classic exposition in the legal literature, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).
2
See Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law,
and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 651, 655–57 (2002); Joseph T. Walsh,
The Fiduciary Foundation of Corporate Law, 27 J. CORP. L. 333, 333–35 (2002); see also 3 FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, Trust and Corporation, in THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM
MAITLAND 321, 395 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1911) (stating “that the connection between Trust
and Corporation is very ancient”).
3
Prior systematic applications of agency cost analysis to trust law are scarce. The
principal exception is A.I. Ogus, The Trust as Governance Structure, 36 U. TORONTO L.J. 186
(1986). This is not to say, however, that agency cost analysis has not occasionally informed
specific analyses. See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, Trusts for Purposes: Policy, Ambiguity, and Anomaly
in the Uniform Laws, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 928 (1999); Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S.
Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 28–30 (1992); Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trusts for the Provision of Private Goods, 37 EMORY L.J. 295, 315–21 (1988); Stewart
E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition To Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P.,
24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2111–14 (2003).
4
ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 5 (1932).
5
1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 1,
at 2 (4th ed. 1987) [hereinafter SCOTT ON TRUSTS].
6
See Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal
and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 435 (1998) (noting that the “literature . . .
tends to be doctrinal rather than . . . functional in perspective”); Ogus, supra note 3, at 186
(noting the “neglect” of the trust by the law-and-economics movement).
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ysis should be amenable to extension in future work to commercial
and charitable trusts.7 The present Article’s contribution is the systematic application of agency theory to the law of donative trusts.
Consider a stylized example. In the prototypical donative trust,
the settlor (“S”) in effect contracts with the trustee (“T”) to manage a
portfolio of assets in the best interests of the beneficiaries (“B1” and
“B2,” collectively the “Bs”), subject to the ex ante restraints imposed
by the settlor.8 Hence, using the vocabulary of agency in economic
rather than legal parlance, T can be viewed as the agent of S; but T
can also be viewed as the agent of B1 and B2. To the extent that T
might slight or ignore what S would have wanted in the ongoing management of the trust, we have a problem of agency costs in the S/T
relationship. But to the extent that T might slight or ignore what B1
and B2 want in the ongoing management of the trust, we have the
usual agency problem when risk-bearing (here by B1 and B2) is separated from management (here by T). So where the corporate form
presents one dominant source of agency costs (the shareholder/manager relationship), the trust presents two. This means that even if the
vocabulary for the economic analysis of trust law will be similar to that
of the economic analysis of corporate law, the underlying analysis will
be different. Given the trust’s independent significance in donative
transfers, commercial transactions, and capital markets,9 this should
not be surprising.
That S saddled her transfer to B1 and B2 with the friction of competing principal-agent relationships is the core insight that animates
the agency costs analysis. This Article’s normative claim is that the law
should minimize the agency costs inherent in locating managerial authority with the trustee (T) and the residual claim with the beneficiaries (B1 and B2), but only to the extent that doing so is consistent
with the ex ante instructions of the settlor (S). This qualification gives
priority to the settlor over the beneficiaries as the trustee’s primary
principal.10 The positive claim is that, at least with respect to tradi7
On extensions to charitable trusts, see infra notes 188, 248, 314 and accompanying
text. On extensions to commercial trusts, see infra notes 13–14, 153, 309–10 and accompanying text.
8
See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625
(1995); see also Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American
Trust Law at Century’s End, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1881 (2000) (noting that developments in
modern trust law have emphasized flexible management “in the pursuit of the best interests of trust beneficiaries within the settlor’s legally permissible objectives”).
9
See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, Trust Law in the United States. A Basic Study
of Its Special Contribution, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 133, 133 (1998); sources cited in infra note 14.
10
For a brief derivation of the basic goal, see infra note 136. In a sense, this Article is
a (long) answer to the question posed by Allen and Kraakman: “If the trustee relationship
is analogized to the agency relationship, whom should we view as the principal?” WILLIAM
T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION § 2.3.3, at 38 (2003); see also id. at 36 (comparing trust law and agency law). Note,
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tional doctrines,11 the law conforms to the suggested normative
approach.12
Theoretical and practical payoffs to the agency costs approach
abound. On the theoretical side, this approach points to a further
research agenda for the economic analysis of trust law. Beneficiaries
assume the role of risk-bearing residual claimants (at least in the context of donative trusts13), and important questions for research include the following: When and why do individuals choose to organize
their relationships, both commercial and donative, by reference to the
law of trusts rather than some other branch of organizational law?14
What is the private trust’s default governance arrangement, and why is
that arrangement the default? Does the law do a good job of supplying the terms for which the relevant parties would have bargained
with full information and low negotiation costs? And, for that matter,
however, that under traditional doctrine the settlor, even if living, cannot enforce the
terms of the trust, see infra Part IV.B.3. Hence the length of the answer.
11
Analysis of modern reforms, such as asset protection trusts, see, e.g., Stewart E.
Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035 (2000),
and the abrogation of the Rule Against Perpetuities, see, e.g., Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the
Rule Against Perpetuities, or the RAP Has No Friends—An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
601 (2000); Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L.
REV. 1303 (2003); Sterk, supra note 3; Angela M. Vallario, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Rule
Against Perpetuities, 25 J. LEGIS. 141 (1999); Note, Dynasty Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2588 (2003), requires consideration not only of agency costs analysis, but also reference to the political economy of modern trust law reform and the
dynamics of the domestic and international regulatory competition for trust business. See
Robert H. Sitkoff & Jonathan L. Corsico, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Business:
Follow the Money (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
12
This Article is therefore in superficial tension with Jonathan Macey’s argument that
common law trust doctrines do not promote efficiency. See Macey, supra note 3, at 296.
For a variety of institutional reasons that Jeffrey Gordon has lucidly described, trends toward efficiency in trust law reflect a blend of common law and statutory reform. See Jeffrey
N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 52
(1987). For further discussion, see Sitkoff & Corsico, supra note 11.
13
See discussion infra Parts III.D & IV.A. The parenthetical qualification is necessary
because in contrast to the settlor of a typical donative trust, “the settlor in a commercial
trust almost always retains a residual interest.” Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as
Business Organizations: Unraveling the Mystery, 58 BUS. LAW. 559, 562 (2003).
14
See Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 560, 573–84 (comparing commercial trusts with
other forms of business organization); see also Michael Bryan, Reflections on Some Commercial
Applications of the Trust, in KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE LAW AND TRUSTS LAW 205–26
(Ian Ramsay ed., 2002) (discussing the increased commercial utility of the trust form);
Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 6, at 472–78 (comparing the trust form and the corporate
form); John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce,
107 YALE L.J. 165, 189 (1997) (discussing the many commercial uses of the trust form);
Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: An Invitation to Comparatists,
13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 321, 321 (2003) (stating that “trusts are increasingly employed
as business organizations in a wide range of commercial and financial transactions in the
United States”). In particular, the trust plays a critical role as a special purpose entity in
structured finance transactions. See, e.g., Edward M. Iacobucci & Ralph A. Winter, Asset
Securitization and Asymmetric Information (Apr. 15, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Cornell Law Review); Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 564–65.
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who are the relevant parties? What is the role of markets—including
labor, product, and capital15—in all of this? Because trusts are chiefly
governed by state law, is there a regulatory competition among the
states, and if so, to what end?16
On the practical side, agency cost analysis offers fresh insights
into recurring problems in trust law including, among others, modification and termination, settlor standing, fiduciary litigation, trust-investment law and the duty of impartiality, trustee removal, the role of
so-called trust protectors, and spendthrift trusts. On several of these
and other issues, there is divergence between American and English
law. Thus, a further benefit of the agency costs approach is that it
provides a framework for evaluating the competing Anglo-American
views.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I situates the analysis
within the current trust law literature. More specifically, Part I advances the claim that classifying trust law as organizational law, and
subjecting it to agency cost analysis, is the logical next step in the nascent economic analysis of the donative private trust. Thus, this Article
does not advance the inherently dubious claim that all prior approaches to the trust should be discarded. On the contrary, the insights arising out of the debate whether trust law is closer to contract
law or property law point to the viability of the agency costs approach.17 In Part II, the Article briefly reviews the agency cost theories of the firm and the economics of the principal-agent problem.
Both underpin this Article’s agency costs approach to trust law. Part
III identifies and then illuminates, through agency cost analysis, the
key relationships between the parties who have an interest in the trust
property or its management. Finally, Part IV develops the Article’s
positive and normative claims with reference to illustrative doctrines
including, but not limited to, the recurring issues mentioned above.
In so doing, Part IV helps to illuminate some of the endogenous gov-

15
See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J.
CORP. L. 565 (2003).
16
See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 11; Sterk, supra note 11, at 1037–38; Sterk, supra
note 3, at 2098; Sitkoff & Corsico, supra note 11.
17
The ensuing agency costs analysis owes some of its stimulation to a pair of recent
articles, the first by John Langbein and the second by Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei.
See Langbein, supra note 8; Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 6; cf. Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 416 (2000)
(describing trust law as a form of organizational law); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 843–49 (2001) (same); Ogus,
supra note 3, at 188 (discussing agency costs in private trusts). Its more general inspiration
is the nexus of contracts models of the firm. See sources cited supra note 1; see also discussion infra Part II.
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ernance considerations relevant to the initial choice to make use of
trust law rather than some other branch of organizational law.18
I
TRUST LAW

AS

ORGANIZATIONAL LAW

This Part advances the claim that trust law blends features familiar from both property and contract law. Hence trust law is properly
classified, and best understood, as organizational law. This Part therefore builds on the debate whether trust law is more closely related to
contract law or property law. Early participants in this debate, which
has been ongoing for over 100 years, include Frederic Maitland (who
took a contractarian perspective), Austin Scott (who took a proprietary perspective), and Harlan Fiske Stone (who took a contractarian
perspective).19 More recently, in both the United States and abroad,
commentators have shown renewed interest in the debate,20 and in
18
Although admittedly relevant to the choice between organizational forms, this Article puts the exogenous tax and bankruptcy features of the private trust to the side (they are
exogenous in that they stem from the tax and bankruptcy codes rather than trust law). For
discussion, see Langbein, supra note 14, at 180–81; Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 581–83.
19
On the “dialogue” between Maitland and Scott, see Langbein, supra note 8, at
644–46 (collecting and describing their publications); see also Harlan F. Stone, The Nature of
the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 467 (1917).
20
For modern American manifestations, see Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand
and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1196–97 & n.13 (1985);
Ronald Chester & Sarah Reid Ziomek, Removal of Corporate Trustees Under the Uniform Trust
Code and Other Current Law: Does a Contractual Lense Help Clarify the Rights of Beneficiaries?, 67
MO. L. REV. 241, 244–46 (2002); Joel C. Dobris, Changes in the Role and the Form of the Trust
at the New Millennium, or, We Don’t Have to Think of England Anymore, 62 ALB. L. REV. 543, 546
n.22 (1998); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1178 &
n.73 (1999); Merrill & Smith, supra note 17, at 844 n.248; see also ELIAS CLARK ET AL., GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS: WILLS, INTESTATE SUCCESSION, TRUSTS, GIFTS, FUTURE INTERESTS, AND
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 454–56 (4th ed. 1999); JOEL C. DOBRIS ET AL., ESTATES AND
TRUSTS 476–77 (2d ed. 2003); RICHARD POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY ¶ 513[3], at 41141–50 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., rev. 2003); Gregory S. Alexander, The Transformation of
Trusts as a Legal Category, 1800–1914, 5 L. & HIST. REV. 303, 336–50 (1987). For modern
English manifestations, see RICHARD EDWARDS & NIGEL STOCKWELL, TRUSTS AND EQUITY
16–29 (5th ed. 2002); GRAHAM MOFFAT ET AL., TRUSTS LAW: TEXTS AND MATERIALS 190–95
(3d ed. 1999); PAUL TODD & SARAH WILSON, TEXTBOOK ON TRUSTS §§ 2.2, 2.3, at 50–69
(6th ed. 2003); Joshua Getzler, Legislative Incursions into Modern Trusts Doctrine in England:
The Trustee Act 2000 and the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, 2 GLOBAL JURIST
TOPICS Art. 2, at 6–14 (2002) [hereinafter Getzler, Legislative Incursions]; Joshua Getzler,
Patterns of Fusion, in THE CLASSIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS 157, 164–67 (Peter Birks ed.,
1997) [hereinafter Getzler, Patterns]; George L. Gretton, Trusts Without Equity, 49 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 599, 603–08 (2000); David Hayton, Developing the Obligation Characteristic of the
Trust, 117 L.Q. REV. 96, 1008 (2001); Neil Jones, Trusts in England After the Statute of Uses: A
View from the 16th Century, in ITINERA FIDUCIAE: TRUST AND TREUHAND IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 173, 192–96 (Richard Helmholz & Reinhard Zimmerman eds., 1998); Paul Matthews, From Obligation to Property, and Back Again? The Future of the Non-Charitable Purpose
Trust, in EXTENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF TRUSTS AND SIMILAR RING-FENCED FUNDS 203,
203–41 (David Hayton ed., 2002) [hereinafter EXTENDING THE BOUNDARIES]; Jonathan Hilliard, On the Irreducible Core Content of Trusteeship—A Reply to Professors Matthews and Parkinson, 17 TOLLEY’S TR. L. INT’L 144 (2003); Michael Macnair, The Conceptual Basis of Trusts in
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particular John Langbein, Henry Hansmann, Ugo Mattei, and Reinier
Kraakman have infused it with greater economic sophistication.21
A. Trust Law as Property Law
Trust law is most frequently classified as a species of property
law.22 For example, the 1959 Restatement (Second) of Trusts characterizes the “creation of a trust . . . as a conveyance of the beneficial interest in the trust property rather than as a contract.”23 Gregory
Alexander recently distinguished the trustee’s fiduciary obligations
from those of corporate and other fiduciaries on the ground that the
fiduciary relationship in trust law is “property-based.”24 A leading English treatise contends that the law of trusts “is at the heart of the
common law of property.”25 The first two volumes of the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts, published in final form in 2003, retain the view that
the beneficiaries’ stake in a trust is in the nature of a property
interest.26
However, merely classifying trust law as property law, without
coupling that classification with a functional analysis of the trust’s proprietary or in rem features, does little to advance our substantive understanding of why trust law takes the form that it does.27 To be sure,
the Later 17th and Early 18th Centuries, in ITINERA FIDUCIAE, supra, at 207, 221–29; R.C. Nolan, Property in a Fund, 120 L. Q. REV. 108, 111–17 (2004). The debate manifests elsewhere
as well, both within the common law countries, see Patrick Parkinson, Reconceptualising the
Express Trust, 61 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 657 (2002) (Australia); C.E.F. Rickett, The Classification of
Trusts, 18 N.Z. U. L. REV. 305 (1999) (New Zealand), and without, see Stefan Grundmann,
The Evolution of Trust and Treuhand in the 20th Century, in ITINERA FIDUCIAE, supra, at 469,
471–78 (Germany).
21
See Langbein, supra note 8; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 17; Hansmann &
Mattei, supra note 6.
22
See Langbein, supra note 8, at 643–46; see also EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., PROBLEMS
AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS’ ESTATES AND TRUSTS 605–06 (6th ed. 2000); Parkinson,
supra note 20, at 657–58.
23
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 cmt. b (1959); see Langbein, supra note 8,
at 648–49.
24
Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 767, 768 & n.7 (2000); see also Getzler, Legislative Incursions, supra note 20, Art. 2, at
10–14 (similar analysis by an English trust scholar); cf. Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 570–82
(comparing the fiduciary obligation in corporate law and trust law).
25
ROBERT A. PEARCE & JOHN STEVENS, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND EQUITABLE OBLIGATIONS v (3d ed. 2002).
26
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 5(i) & cmt. i (2003) (stating that contracts to convey or for the benefit of third parties are not trusts).
27
See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 6, at 435 (“While there is an extensive legal
literature on the institution of the trust, that literature—whether domestic or comparative
in focus—tends to be doctrinal rather than broadly functional in perspective.”); id. at
435–38 (discussing the benefits of a functional analysis of trust law); see also Langbein,
supra note 8, at 643–69 (discussing suppression of the contractarian perspective and noting
the functional correspondence between trust and contract); Sarah Worthington, The Commercial Utility of the Trust Vehicle, in EXTENDING THE BOUNDARIES, supra note 20, at 135 (noting the general lack of functional analysis of trusts).
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the existence of specifically identified property (the trust res) is necessary for trust formation.28 But continuing to deem trust law a species
of property law on that basis,29 or to do so because of the private
trust’s origin in the conveyance of land, obscures not only the trust’s
proprietary functions, but also its highly enabling, elastic, flexible, and
default nature with respect to in personam relations. As Scott’s famous treatise observes, “[t]he duties of the trustee are such as the
creator of the trust may choose to impose; the interests of the beneficiaries are such as he may choose to confer upon them.”30
Accordingly, the task for the functional study of trust law should
be to identify the trust’s in rem, proprietary elements and then to
illuminate how they have been blended with its in personam, contractarian elements. As Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith recently observed, the modern law of trusts offers many of the in rem benefits of
property law while simultaneously offering much of the in personam
flexibility of contract law.31
B. The Contractarian Challenge
In an important recent article, John Langbein offered a functional account of trust law that challenged the traditional view by contending that trust law’s contractarian elements predominate. To
Langbein, “the deal between settlor and trustee is functionally indistinguishable from the modern third-party-beneficiary contract. Trusts
are contracts.”32 In comparison to the meaning of contractarian as
the term is used in the literature of corporate law and economics,
Langbein’s contractarian approach is more closely allied with the law
of contracts than with the “nexus of contracts” metaphor that informs
28
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 74 (1959); 1A SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 5,
§ 74, at 428–32; see also Jane B. Baron, The Trust Res and Donative Intent, 61 TUL. L. REV. 45,
47–50 (1986) (describing the “res requirement”). This is an important difference between
the trust and a life insurance contract. The insurance company, unlike a trustee, is not
required to segregate assets. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 332 n.2 (6th ed. 2000).
29
See 1A SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 5, § 74, at 428–32; Parkinson, supra note 20, at
658–59, 663–67; Rickett, supra note 20, at 308–09; see also Baron, supra note 28, at 50–70
(criticizing traditional justifications for the res requirement without analyzing whether the
requirement is functional); cf. Langbein, supra note 8, at 627 (“In truth, the trust is a deal,
a bargain about how the trust assets are to be managed and distributed.”).
30
1 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 5, § 1, at 2.
31
See Merrill & Smith, supra note 17, at 843–49; see also Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 375 (2002); cf. FRANCIS S. PHILBRICK, PROPERTY 150–60
(1939); Hayton, supra note 20, at 107–08. A further useful feature of trust law is its amenability to the creation of exotic beneficial interests without dividing legal title. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 17, at 848–49; Heller, supra note 20, at 1178.
32
Langbein, supra note 8, at 627; see also Parkinson, supra note 20, at 659 (arguing
“that the law of trusts is better conceptualised as a species of obligation rather than being
understood as a form of property ownership”).
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the agency cost theories of the firm.33 On this view, the basis for the
rights and remedies of the beneficiary against the trustee—which is to
say the law of trust governance—might be understood, for expositional purposes, as a third-party beneficiary contract between the settlor and trustee.34
Langbein’s analysis implies that trust law’s role is to offer a set of
standardized terms that minimize transaction costs for the deal between the settlor and the trustee. By invoking the law of trusts, the
settlor and the trustee need only record the extent to which their deal
deviates from the default governance regime.35 This view has two important normative implications. First, trust law’s default governance
regime, including most critically the fiduciary obligation of the trustee
to the beneficiaries,36 should reflect the terms for which the parties
would likely have bargained with low negotiation costs and full information. Second, courts should employ an intention-seeking approach
on questions of interpretation.37 Thus, with respect to matters of internal trust governance, Langbein demonstrates the positive and normative power of the sort of hypothetical bargain analysis that is
familiar from both contract and corporate law and economics.38
For purposes of understanding the relevance of trust law to the
dealings of the trust’s principal parties with outsiders, however, the
model of the trust as functionally equivalent to a third-party beneficiary contract encounters difficulty. In the usual third-party beneficiary
contract, the rights of the parties and third-party beneficiaries do not
touch the rights of other nonparties. But regulating the relationships
with outsiders of the trust’s insiders (the trustee, the beneficiaries, and
the settlor) is a key feature of trust law39—one that implicates some33
Compare Langbein, supra note 8, at 627 (“Trusts are Contracts.”), with BAINBRIDGE,
supra note 1, at 28 (“As used by contractarians, however, the term [nexus of contracts] is
not limited to those relationships that constitute legal contracts.”). See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm,
24 J. CORP. L. 819, 822–23 (1999); see also discussion infra Part II.C; sources cited supra note
1.
34
See Langbein, supra note 8, at 627. One might think of the rights and duties imposed by the trust instrument as stemming not from trust law but rather from the law of the
trust. Cf. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.1, at 425–26 (3d ed. 1999) (distinguishing
between “contract law” and the “law of the contract”).
35
See Langbein, supra note 8, at 660; see also Ogus, supra note 3, at 206–07 (noting the
“transaction costs savings” provided by trust law’s default rules).
36
See discussion infra Part IV.D.
37
See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
38
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 89–91 (1989) (collecting illustrative examples of
such analysis); see Langbein, supra note 8, at 630, 663–64.
39
This is the crucial contribution of Hansmann and Mattei. See Hansmann & Mattei,
supra note 6, at 466; see also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 390 (“[T]he essential
role of all forms of organizational law is to provide for the creation of a pattern of creditors’ rights—a form of ‘asset partitioning’—that could not practicably be established other-
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thing of an in rem dynamic. This includes the law of trustee insolvency (an exceedingly rare phenomenon in donative trusts but an
important consideration for commercial trusts);40 spendthrift trusts
(the more common problem of beneficiary insolvency);41 equitable
tracing principles;42 and the continuity of the office of the trustee despite turnover in its occupant.43 Explanation of these features requires acknowledgement of trust law’s proprietary features. Thus, as
Langbein concluded, “[t]rust is a hybrid of contract and property,
and acknowledging contractarian elements does not require disregarding property components whose convenience abides.”44
C. Asset Partitioning and Organizational Law
In an article subsequent to Langbein’s that explored the functional relevance of trust law’s proprietary features, Henry Hansmann
and Ugo Mattei argued “that it is precisely the property-like aspects of
the trust that are the principal contribution of trust law.”45 This is not
to say that they took up the mantle of Austin Scott. To the contrary,
they “agree with Langbein that, so far as the relationships between the
settlor, the trustee, and the beneficiary are concerned, trust law adds
very little to contract law.”46 Rather, they argued that the important
wise.” (footnote omitted)); Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 9, at 147 (“[T]he important
contribution of trust law lies not in its ordering, via default rules of contract, of the relationships among the three principal parties to a trust-like relationship . . . but rather in its
ordering of the relationships between those persons and third parties with whom they
deal.”). For further discussion of this function of trust law, see infra Part I.C.
40
Langbein called the law of trustee insolvency “the weak point of contractarian analysis.” Langbein, supra note 8, at 667; see also Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 6, at 454–61,
469–72 (noting that the transaction costs of using contract to protect the trust assets from
an insolvent trustee’s creditors “would often be prohibitively high”); Merrill & Smith, supra
note 17, at 846–47 (discussing third party information processing costs and trustee insolvency). On the relevance of insolvency to commercial trusts, see Schwarcz, supra note 13,
at 581–83.
41
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 149–62 (1959) (discussing spendthrift trusts); infra Part IV.C.2 (same). Although the law of contracts sometimes allows the
promisee (the role played by the settlor in Langbein’s model) to disable the third-party
beneficiary from assigning her chose in action to another, see FARNSWORTH, supra note 34,
§ 11.4, at 717–18, it does not allow the promisee to disable the third-party beneficiary from
alienating that interest to both voluntary and involuntary creditors. See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 6, at 452–53 & n.58.
42
See infra Part IV.C.1.
43
See infra Part III.B. In fairness, however, many contracts provide for assumption or
assignment to deal with the turnover problem. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 34,
§§ 11.1–11.11.
44
Langbein, supra note 8, at 669. Maitland’s conclusion is similar. A beneficial interest in a trust “is something far better than the mere benefit of a promise.” MAITLAND, supra
note 2, at 353. Note also the exclusion of the declaration of trust from Langbein’s analysis.
See Langbein, supra note 8, at 672–75; see also Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d 600 (Ill. 1955)
(holding a trust declaration to be a valid inter vivos trust).
45
Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 6, at 469.
46
Id. at 470.
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contribution of trust law is its ability “to facilitate an accompanying
reorganization of rights and responsibilities between the three principal parties [settlor, trustee, and beneficiary] and third parties, such as
creditors, with whom the principal parties deal.”47 Hansmann and
Mattei refer in particular to “the use of trust law to shield trust assets
from claims of the trustee’s personal creditors.”48
Thus Hansmann and Mattei stressed the importance of trust law’s
“asset partitioning” function.49 The partitioning of assets provided for
by trust law allows the trustee to deal separately with creditors of the
trust property and those of his or her own personal property. With
respect to all creditors, the law of trusts in effect (though not formally,
at least not yet50) splits the trustee into “two distinct legal persons: a
natural person contracting on behalf of himself, and an artificial person acting on behalf of the beneficiaries.”51 This creation of two distinct legal persons could not feasibly be reproduced with explicit
contracting.52 Asset partitioning therefore represents an important
difference between organizational forms and simple contractual ar-

47
Id. at 472; see also id. at 451–64 (outlining the manner by which trust law organizes
the relationships between various parties). Although this analysis identifies an important
proprietary aspect of trust law, it remains insufficient to support the broader claims that
“organizational law is much more important as property law than as contract law,”
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 390, or that “[p]rivately prepared standard form
contracts” could match the drafting efficiencies of the present system of public provision of
default rules for trust governance, Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 6, at 449. True, in the
absence of trust law the parties could incorporate the language of the Restatement’s fiduciary provisions into their deal. See id. at 448. But the viability of that approach depends on
the existence of ample judicial exegesis of the Restatement’s text. Precedent is a public
good, and the terms of a privately prepared contract can be duplicated by anyone. See
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 35; see also Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83
VA. L. REV. 713 (1997); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995); Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 5–6 (Ill. Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 03–11, 2003), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=451060.
48
Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 6, at 438; see id. at 454–61.
49
This contribution may be understood as a specific application of a broader project
on organizational law by Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman. See Hansmann & Kraakman,
supra note 17, at 414–17; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 31, at 405–07.
50
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. a & rep. notes § 2 cmt. a; Halbach,
supra note 8, at 1882 (“Without abandoning the basic definition of a trust as a fiduciary
relationship, there appear to be subtle but practically significant departures from the traditional concept that a trust is not an ‘entity.’”); see also Tatarian v. Commercial Union Ins.
Co., 672 N.E.2d 997, 1000 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (analogizing the trust at issue to a corporation and treating the trust as a separate entity); cf. Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 574–75
(discussing recognition of trusts as legal entities).
51
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 416.
52
See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 6, at 466 (noting that significant transaction
costs would prevent creation of such agreements by contract).
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rangements.53 The former have an external proprietary or in rem dimension that complements their internal contractarian or in
personam features.
By providing a functional explanation for, and a specific identification of, the essential proprietary dimension of trust law, the
Hansmann and Mattei project may be harmonized with Langbein’s
contractarian approach. Taken together, they show that the law of
trusts, like the law of other organizations, offers a careful blending of
in rem and in personam features. This implies that, going forward,
the study of the law of private trusts should more closely resemble the
study of other organizational forms,54 an endeavor in which agency
costs analysis abounds.
D. The Rise of the Managerial Trust
The empirical observation that the modern use of the private
trust increasingly resembles the use of other organizational forms provides further support for treating trust law as organization law. As
Langbein and others have demonstrated, the private trust has evolved
from a vehicle for conveying and preserving ancestral land into an
organizing device that allows owners of property to ensure the ongoing and intergenerational professional management of their wealth.55
This evolution in the use of the trust stems from the liberalization of
testamentary freedom, the lifting of feudal restrictions on land transfer, and the shift in modern wealth away from land.56
Accordingly, in addition to classic but still relevant context-specific rationales such as minimizing taxes and asset protection, the
modern donative trust is also used more generally to bring together
portfolio management skills with investment capital. The use of professional fiduciaries is reported to be on the rise.57 The default rules
53
See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 391–98; see also George G. Triantis,
Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral and Trusts in
Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
54
For a specific application of this general point, see Richard W. Painter, Contracting
Around Conflicts in a Family Representation: Louis Brandeis and the Warren Trust, 8 U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 353, 367–69 (2001).
55
See Langbein, supra note 8, at 632–43; see, e.g., MOFFAT ET AL., supra note 20, at
24–36; Edward C. Halbach, Jr., The Uses and Purposes of Trusts in the United States, in MODERN
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TRUST LAW 123, 133–38 (David Hayton ed., 1999).
56
See John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission,
86 MICH. L. REV. 722 (1988) (discussing historical changes in family wealth); MOFFAT ET
AL., supra note 20, at 33 (“The significance for trusts law of this shift in the nature of family
wealth-holdings—that is, from land (predominantly) to investment assets as well as land—
can scarcely be overstated.”).
57
See Alexander, supra note 24, at 775 (“Today, the vast majority of trusts are administered by large financial institutions, such as trust companies and trust developments of
commercial banks.”); Langbein, supra note 8, at 638 (“Private trustees still abound, but the
prototypical modern trustee is the fee-paid professional, whose business is to enter into
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governing trust investment now require something of a total return
investment strategy consistent with modern portfolio theory.58 The
fiduciary obligation has eclipsed limitations on the trustee’s powers as
the primary tool for aligning the interests of the trustee, who in the
modern private trust is vested with vast discretion, with the interests of
the beneficiaries.59 All of this supports the view that, going forward,
the study of trust law should more closely resemble the study of other
organizational forms. This is perhaps clearest with respect to the
problem of agency costs in the modern managerial trust.
II
ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS
For those unfamiliar with the agency cost theories of the firm or
the economics of the principal-agent problem, this Part offers a brief
overview. The goal is to provide context for the subsequent application of these ideas to the trust.
A. The Theory of the Firm
In his 1937 essay, The Nature of the Firm, Ronald Coase endeavored
to understand why some economic activity took place within firms
rather than in open market transactions.60 Coase’s insight was that
such activity would be organized within firms when the expected costs
of allocating resources by internal direction were less than the expected costs of undertaking the same activity in an open-market transaction.61 Coase therefore demonstrated the salience of transaction
costs. From this beginning have evolved at least three different
though complementary approaches to the theory of the firm.
The transaction costs approach, which is most closely associated
with Oliver Williamson and is probably the most direct descendant of
Coase’s essay, focuses on the boundary between the firm and the marand carry out trust agreements.”); see also Peering into Trust Industry Archives, 115 TR. & EST.
452, 504 (1976) (describing such changes within the trust profession). Several readers of
earlier drafts of this Article questioned the empirical basis for this claim. Although the
claim warrants further investigation, the specific point is not critical to the ensuing agency
costs analysis. Thus this empirical study will remain a project for another article. See generally Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 587–88 (discussing the feasibility of empirical study in trust
law).
58
See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
59
See Langbein, supra note 8, at 637–43; see also John H. Langbein, The Uniform Trust
Code: Codification of the Law of Trusts in the United States, 15 TOLLY’S TR. L. INT’L 66, 71
(2001) (noting the statutory trend toward “maximum trustee empowerment”).
60
R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). For a general introduction to Coase’s theory and to other theoretical approaches to the firm, see Oliver Hart,
An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (1989).
61
Coase, supra note 60, at 390–93.
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ket.62 Property rights theories of the firm are “very much in the spirit
of the transaction cost literature of Coase and Williamson, but differ[ ] by focusing attention on the role of physical, that is, nonhuman,
assets in a contractual relationship.”63 The core relationships that aggregate into the trust as an organizational form, however, are generally open-market transactions rather than intra-firm transfers.64 This
suggests that neither the transaction costs nor the property rights approaches are as immediately relevant to the present project as the
agency cost theories.
Agency cost theories of the firm model organizations as webs of
express, implied, and metaphorical contracts among individuals with
conflicting interests. At the center of this web is an organizing legal
construct.65 The critical insight of this so-called “nexus of contracts”
approach was to demonstrate the importance of principal-agent economics for the study of organizations. As Jensen and Meckling put it,
“[m]any problems associated with the inadequacy of the current theory of the firm can also be viewed as special cases of the theory of
agency relationships.”66 The agency cost theories of the firm focus on
the problems of shirking and monitoring that stem from information
asymmetries within the organization’s component relationships. A
brief review of the economics of agency is therefore in order.67
62

See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARRELATIONAL CONTRACTING 15–42 (1985).
63
Hart, supra note 60, at 1765; see, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The
Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691
(1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON.
1119 (1990).
64
See Rock & Wachter, supra note 2, at 664–66.
65
See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 310 & n.12; sources cited supra note 1.
66
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 308; see also Fama, supra note 1, at 291; Fama &
Jensen, Separation, supra note 1, at 307–11.
67
For accessible and relatively nonmathematical introductions to principal-agent
modeling, see HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH
667–88 (6th ed. 2003) [hereinafter VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS]; PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 166–247 (1992);
Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF
BUSINESS 37–51 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985); Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 57 (1989). Several
formal introductions are also generally accessible. See DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 577–719 (1990); JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & DAVID MARTIMORT, THE
THEORY OF INCENTIVES: THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL (2002); ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL.,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 477–510 (1995); HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS
440–71 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS]. Important scholarly statements include Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the PrincipalAgent Problem, 51 ECONOMETRICA 7 (1983); Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74 (1979); Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The
Principal’s Problem, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 134 (1973); Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives
in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979). Finally, for discussion by
legal scholars of the applicability of principal-agent modeling to legal problems, see
HOWELL E. JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 88–100 (2003); Eric A. PosKETS,
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B. The Economics of Agency
Using the vocabulary of agency in economic rather than legal
parlance,68 agency problems are caused by the impossibility of complete contracting when one party (the agent) has discretionary and
unobservable decision-making authority that affects the wealth of another party (the principal). When the agent’s effort is unobservable,
ex post enforcement of the ex ante bargain, no matter how detailed it
may be, is impractical. The problem is that the principal will be unable to ascertain whether the agent’s breach or an exogenous factor
caused a disappointing result. Thus, unless there is a perfect correlation between the agent’s effort and the project’s observable profits, in
which case a good or bad return would conclusively show the level of
the agent’s effort,69 it will be difficult for the principal to prevent
shirking by the agent. This is the problem of “hidden action,” sometimes called “moral hazard.”70 The problem is one of post-contractual
asymmetric information.71
Real estate agents are a common illustration in the literature.
Consider an agent working on a five percent commission.72 Assuming
that the property owner cannot feasibly monitor the agent’s daily activities, then the agent will have no incentive to put in even $10 of
additional effort to increase the sale price by $100, as the payoff to the
agent of the extra effort is only $5. However, the $10 of additional
effort would have been in the principal’s best interests. If the parties’
interests were perfectly aligned (as would be the case if the agent were
also the property owner), then the agent would have undertaken the
ner, Agency Models in Law and Economics, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 225
(Eric A. Posner ed., 2000).
68
The difference is that a principal-agent relationship in law requires a showing of
control. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 1.01 & cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001); cf. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 10,
§ 2.3.3, at 36 (stating that “the trustee is ordinarily not subject to the control of the
beneficiary”).
69
See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 67, at 478–79; Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1045, 1048–51 (1991).
70
See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 67, at 477 n.1 (defining “moral hazard”).
71
A nice statement may be found at LAFFONT & MARTIMORT, supra note 67, at 3:
The starting point of incentive theory corresponds to the problem of delegating a task to an agent with private information. This private information
can be of two types: either the agent can take an action unobserved by the
principal, the case of moral hazard or hidden action; or the agent has some
private knowledge about his cost or valuation that is ignored by the principal, the case of adverse selection or hidden knowledge.
See also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 67, at 50–58.
72
This illustration is borrowed from Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 91; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 701 (1982); see also Posner, supra note 67, at
225–29 (discussing real estate brokerage contracts from an agency theory perspective).
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$10 effort. The agent’s failure to do so leads to a welfare loss. True,
the divergence in this example is an artifact of the five percent commission; a higher commission—say, fifteen percent—would have
solved the problem here. But no compensation scheme short of transferring complete ownership of the project to the agent will solve the
incentive problem in all possible scenarios when the agent’s efforts
are unobservable.
The losses to the parties that stem from such a misalignment of
interests are called agency costs. The Jensen and Meckling definition
is ubiquitous in the legal literature: Agency costs refers to the sum of
the costs of the principal’s “monitoring expenditures,” the costs of the
agent’s “bonding expenditures,” and the “residual loss” as measured
by the “dollar equivalent of the reduction in welfare experienced by
the principal” as result of the divergence in the principal’s and the
agent’s interests.73 In the foregoing example, the lost $100 increase
in the sale price would count as residual loss.
C. Agency Costs and Organizational Forms
Returning to the agency cost theories of the firm, the arresting
insight of the Jensen and Meckling nexus of contracts model was that
the study of organizational forms involves, more concretely, the study
of clusters or webs of discrete principal-agent relationships.74 Accordingly, subsequent research has explored the effectiveness of various
devices, legal and otherwise, at minimizing agency costs within different organizational forms. This literature has also thrown light on the
governance features that distinguish different organizational forms
from each other.75 In particular, the literature of enterprise organizations has explored managerial labor markets,76 incentive compensation,77 alienable residual claims,78 flexible sharing rules and mutual
monitoring,79 the market for corporate control (i.e., the takeover
73

R

74

R

Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 308.
See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
75
See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Organizational Forms and Investment
Decisions, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 101, 117–19 (1985); Fama & Jensen, Separation, supra note 1, at
311–21.
76
See, e.g., Fama, supra note 1, at 294–95.
77
See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3B HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2485 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999); Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al.,
Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
751 (2002); Symposium, Management Compensation and the Managerial Labor Market, 7 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 3 (1985); Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment or Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123 (2000).
78
See, e.g., Fama & Jensen, Residual Claims, supra note 1, at 332–33.
79
See id. at 335–36 (discussing professional partnerships).

R
R

R

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

\\server05\productn\C\CRN\89-3\CRN302.txt

638

unknown

Seq: 18

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

27-FEB-04

9:29

[Vol. 89:621

market),80 disclosure rules,81 and liability rules such as fiduciary duties,82 as devices for minimizing agency costs.
The trust, although amenable to such analysis, has not similarly
been subjected to systematic agency cost analysis.83
III
THE AGENCY COSTS MODEL
In comparison to the agency costs approach to corporate law,84
the agency costs approach to trust law is both simpler and more complex. It is simpler because the trust is a less complicated organization.
This makes the agency cost analysis and reckoning the hypothetical
bargain of the principal parties easier. The analysis is more complicated, however, because the actions of those individuals interested in
the trust are not metered by price signals from efficient capital markets.85 Moreover, the law regularly subordinates the interests of the
beneficiaries as residual claimants to the dead-hand interests of the
settlor, an outgrowth of the frequently paternalistic function of the
donative trust.86
A. The Contractarian Nexus
The trust is more than a simple contract between private parties.
It is an organizational form with in rem as well as in personam dimensions. Thus, like the corporation and other organizational forms, the
trust blends external in rem asset partitioning with internal in personam contractarian flexibility. The trust’s internal relationships are
contractarian not only because the law supplies default terms around
which the parties may contract, but also because the underlying gov80
See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110 (1965); see also, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973 (2002); Symposium, The Market for Corporate Control:
The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983).
81
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984); Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a
Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047 (1995).
82
See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261
(1986); infra notes 290–97 and accompanying text.
83
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
84
The clearest example is the model of the corporation as a nexus of contracts, which
was most notably advanced in the legal literature by Easterbook and Fischel. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, 1–39; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989).
85
See generally Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 568–72. The trust has this in common with the
close corporation. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and
Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 274–77 (1986).
86
See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows, Spendthrift Trusts: Roots and Relevance for Twenty-First
Century Planning, 50 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 140, 149–64 (1995); infra note 136 and accompanying text.
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ernance problems that stem from the asymmetric information of the
parties are amenable to principal-agent modeling.
True, there is tension between the contractarian metaphor and
the position of the beneficiary. Beneficiaries are not normally
thought to give ex ante consent, and typically they are in no position
to bargain. Moreover, as discussed in Part I, there remains much debate about whether the beneficiaries’ stake in the trust is a contract or
property right.87 But even if the beneficiaries do not literally contract
with the other principal parties, and even if the beneficiaries’ stake is
doctrinally more proprietary than contractarian, contractarian principal-agent modeling nonetheless illuminates the problems of governance relevant to the beneficiaries’ welfare. From an economic
perspective, hidden action (and possibly hidden information)
abounds, so trust governance must confront both incentive and risksharing problems.88
Accordingly, greater insight into the nature and function of trust
law will come from a conception of the trust as a de facto entity that
serves as the organizing construct for an aggregation of contractarian
relationships. This vision of the trust is analogous to the Jensen and
Meckling nexus of contracts model of the firm.89 As was the case with
their analysis of the corporation, this conception of the trust implies
the viability of agency cost analysis for trust law.
To return to the exemplary trust described in the Introduction,
which was settled by S for the benefit of B1 and B2 with T as trustee,
the constituent relationships include, but are not limited to, those
between:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

S and T;
T and the Bs;
S and the Bs;
T and T’s creditors;
the Bs and the Bs’ creditors;
S and S’s creditors;
S and the trust protector (who will be introduced later);90

87

See discussion supra Part I.A–B.
See generally Eisenhardt, supra note 67, at 58–59 (discussing situations amenable to
agency cost analysis).
89
Jensen and Meckling argued that most organizations, including the corporation,
could be characterized as a “legal fiction[,] . . . [an] artificial construct under the law
which allows certain organizations to be treated as individuals.” Jensen & Meckling, supra
note 1, at 310 n.12. These entities “serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships
among individuals.” Id. at 310 (emphasis omitted); cf. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note
1, at 11–12 (discussing the various contractual relationships that form corporations); Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 1, at 777–78 (describing the firm as a “centralized contractual
agent in a team productive process” (emphasis omitted)).
90
See infra Part IV.B.4.
88
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8. the Bs and the trust protector;
9. T and T’s agents (to whom T delegates authority); and
10. T’s delegates and the Bs.91
The dominant (and sometimes conflicting) relationships exist between S and T and between the Bs and T.
Distilling the trust into its constituent relationships brings into
view the applicability of hypothetical bargain analysis and the economics of the principal-agent problem. Both the relationship between S
and T and the relationship between the Bs and T might be modeled
on the principal-agent scheme. The former presents the temporal
agency problem that helps distinguish the economic analysis of trust
law from that of corporate law.92 The latter presents the traditional
agency problem when risk-bearing is separated from management.
This means that there is potential for considerable tension between
T’s loyalty to S and T’s loyalty to the Bs. As we shall see in the next
Part, American law resolves this tension by requiring T to maximize
the welfare of the Bs within the ex ante constraints imposed by S. This
is to say that, under the American approach (but not necessarily
under the English approach) the donor’s intent controls.
91
See, e.g., In re Bond & Mortgage Guar. Co., 103 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 1952) (discussing
the relationship between the trustee’s agent, in this case the trustee’s lawyers, and the
beneficiaries); Surrogates Court Decision of Interest: In re Kellogg, N.Y.L.J. Dec. 30, 1999, at 25
(same). The importance of the relations that fall into these last two categories, numbers 9
and 10 above, has increased with the assimilation of portfolio theory into modern prudent
investor standards. Current law now permits, and might even require, amateur trustees to
delegate investment authority to professionals. Langbein calls this phenomenon the “fractionation of trusteeship.” John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future
of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 665–66 (1996) [hereinafter Langbein, The Uniform
Prudent Investor Act]; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 171 &
cmt. f (1992); UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9, 7B U.L.A. 280 (2000); John H. Langbein,
Reversing the Nondelegation Rule of Trust-Investment Law, 59 MO. L. REV. 105, 115–16 (1994);
see also Langbein, supra note 59, at 72–73; accord P. J. REED & R. C. WILSON, THE TRUSTEE
ACT 2000: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 11 (2001) (highlighting the similar shift in prudent investor
rules in the United Kingdom). These scenarios might be amenable to modeling as a common agency. For examples of such modeling and discussions of common agency, see B.
Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Common Agency, 54 ECONOMETRICA 923 (1986);
Joel S. Demski & David Sappington, Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents, 33 J.
ECON. THEORY 152 (1984); Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324
(1982); Bengt Holmström & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (1991); Hideshi Itoh, Incentives To Help in Multi-Agent Situations, 59 ECONOMETRICA 611 (1991).
92
The temporal agency problem also distinguishes the economic analysis of trust law
from that of agency law. Legal agency requires the ongoing existence of a principal under
whose control the agent acts. This enables the agent to seek clarification from the principal and facilitates the principal’s monitoring of the agent. See sources cited supra note 68.
Not surprisingly, the lack of monitoring by disabled principals of agents acting under a
durable power of attorney is a cause for concern. See Carolyn L. Dessin, Acting as Agent
Under a Financial Durable Power of Attorney: An Unscripted Role, 75 NEB. L. REV. 574, 584–88
(1996).
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B. The Office of the Trustee
The office of the trustee is in effect (though not formally) a separate entity from the trustee personally.93 This separate entity-like effect, which stems from the trust’s partitioning of assets, implicates an
in rem dynamic, as it is effective against nonparties to the trust. The
de facto office of the trustee serves as the organizing hub for the various relations that aggregate into the trust.94
With respect to creditors, turnover within the office of the trustee
or the personal insolvency of a particular trustee does not affect the
continuity of the trust. Deals struck by a prior trustee, while acting as
trustee, bind successor trustees to the extent that they would have
been enforceable against the prior trustee.95 The prior trustee, however, has no office-based liability to the trust’s creditors once out of
office. No trustee, whether in or out of office, has personal liability to
the trust’s outside creditors unless he or she personally guaranteed
the obligation.96 And the personal creditors of an insolvent trustee—
a rather rare phenomenon in donative trusts, but an important consideration for commercial trusts—have no recourse against the assets
of the trust.97
The rules that govern the trustee’s liability toward creditors of the
trust property tend to be mandatory with respect to the settlor, but
default with respect to the trustee and those with whom the trustee
deals.98 They are mandatory with respect to the settlor, because as to
93
More precisely, the office of trustee is in effect a separate legal person. See supra
notes 49–53 and accompanying text. In contrast to corporate law, in trust law there are few
if any prescriptions regarding the required structure for the (albeit de facto) fictitious
separate entity.
94
Cf. David Hayton, The Uses of Trusts in the Commercial Context, in MODERN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TRUST LAW, supra note 55, 145, 155–57 (discussing the office of
the trustee and noting that continuity of the trust is unaffected by “the death or dissolution
of a trustee”); Worthington, supra note 27, at 155–57 (discussing the separate rights of the
trustee’s creditors and the trust’s creditors).
95
See, e.g., Schroeder v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 510 N.E.2d 1045, 1048–49 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1987); Wood v. Potter, 289 N.W. 131, 133–34 (Mich. 1939). The qualification addresses
the possibility of self-dealing or other grounds for voiding the transaction. The failure of a
successor trustee to pursue such remedies would be an independent breach of trust. See
infra note 101 and accompanying text.
96
See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1010(a), 7C U.L.A. 227 (Supp. 2003). The traditional
rule of personal liability unless otherwise provided, see 3A SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 5,
§ 261, at 417; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 265 & cmt. a (1959), can be understood
as a penalty default that forces trustees to disclose that they are operating in a representative rather than an individual capacity. See Hansman & Mattei, supra note 6, at 459–61;
Merrill & Smith, supra note 17, at 846–47.
97
See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 6, at 454. See generally Macnair, supra note 20, at
224–29 (discussing the evolution of trustee liability); Worthington, supra note 27, at
155–58 (reviewing the rights of the beneficiaries and of the creditors of the beneficiaries,
trustee, settlor, and the trust property).
98
See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1010(a), 7C U.L.A. 227 (Supp. 2003); id. § 105(b)(11)
(“The terms of a trust prevail over [common and statutory law] except . . . the rights under
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the settlor these rules have an in rem quality—they touch on the
rights of outsiders.99 They are, in contrast, default with respect to the
trustee and outside creditors, because as to these parties the rules concern only in personam matters—they touch only the rights of insiders.
Parties may fix their rights with respect to each other, but when the
rights of outsiders become involved, the law limits the parties’
flexibility.
The rules of trustee liability toward beneficiaries are quite different. But these differences follow naturally from the nexus of contracts
model of organizational forms, which implies that it is the trustee personally who agrees to manage the assets held by the trustee as trustee.
Thus, the beneficiaries may seek to surcharge a trustee personally for
breach of trust not only while the trustee is in office, but also after the
trustee has been sacked. Removal does not extinguish the trustee’s
personal liability for breaches committed while in office.100 The
breaching trustee’s successor, however, is not personally liable to the
beneficiaries for the prior trustee’s breach unless the successor unreasonably fails to discover and rectify the prior breach. Liability in this
scenario, however, stems from the successor trustee’s own breach in
unreasonably failing to address her predecessor’s blunder.101
The rules of internal trust governance, which determine the
rights inter se of the beneficiaries, the settlor, and the trustee, are for
the most part default as to the settlor.102 That not all of these rules
are default, however, suggests that there is a mandatory foundation of
trust governance law. Indeed, as Langbein explains, even though a
Sections 1010 through 1013 of a person other than a trustee or beneficiary.”); id. Art. 10
gen. cmt. (“The settlor may not limit the rights of persons other than beneficiaries as
provided in Sections 1010 through 1013.”). See generally John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules
in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (comparing mandatory and
default rules in trust law); Langbein, supra note 59, at 76–79 (analyzing the UTC’s
mandatory features); David M. English, Is There a Uniform Trust Act in Your Future?, PROB. &
PROP. 25, 27 (Jan./Feb. 2000); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 263 (1959) (discussing trustee liability to third parties); 3A SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 5, § 263, at 423–32
(same).
99
On similar reasoning agency law does not allow principals to opt out of liability to
third parties for the acts of agents for which the agents have apparent authority. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 159–61 (1958).
100
As a practical matter, this liability is often fixed in an accounting proceeding made
incident to the removal action.
101
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 223 (1959); 3 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note
5, § 223, at 395–96. This explains why many professionally drafted trustee succession provisions absolve the successor from this audit responsibility. Without such absolution, many
potential successors would decline to serve. See VALERIE J. VOLLMAR ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO TRUSTS AND ESTATES 1072–73 (2003); Charles F. Gibbs & Collen F. Carew, Liability
of Successor Fiduciary for its Predecessor, N.Y.L.J. 1 (Mar. 18, 2003).
102
See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105, 7C U.L.A. 139 (Supp. 2003); Langbein, supra
note 8, at 651, 660–63.
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settlor may opt out of individual fiduciary duties, she cannot authorize
a bad faith trusteeship or oust fiduciary law in its entirety.103
Part of the explanation for these limits is the obvious agency cost
consequences of giving the trustee unfettered discretion. Hence
these limits serve a protective and cautionary function for the settlor
who might otherwise unwittingly swamp her beneficiary in an agency
costs morass. However, this explanation is incomplete, because the
protective and cautionary function could probably have been
achieved with a penalty default.104
Further justification for these mandatory elements lies in the
need to ensure that third parties who transact with the trustee can
easily ascertain whether property in the possession of the trustee belongs to the trustee personally, is held in trust, or is held in some
other limited form such as an equitable charge.105 There is a
mandatory irreducible minimum of trust governance, in other words,
not only to serve a protective and cautionary function, but also because on this issue the in personam (i.e., internal governance) converges with the in rem (i.e., external relations).106 As the Delaware
Supreme Court put it in a recent opinion: “A trust in which there is no
legally binding obligation on a trustee is a trust in name only and
more in the nature of an absolute estate or fee simple grant of
property.”107
C. The Relative Position of the Settlor
The settlor’s intent to create a trust is a prerequisite to trust formation.108 This means that Langbein’s third-party beneficiary contract between the settlor and the trustee is the trigger for the cascade
of individual relationships that compose the trust. The settlor-trustee
relationship is indeed contractual, as settlors and trustees are free to
103

See Langbein, supra note 98.
See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 38, at 95–107; see also infra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing exoneration clauses).
105
Cf. Merrill & Smith, supra note 17 (discussing the third party information costs
associated with various forms of property and contract rights). An equitable charge is created when one party transfers property to another, not subject to a fiduciary obligation
(indeed the transferee is permitted to benefit personally from the transferred property),
but nevertheless subject to the right of a third party to receive a payment from the transferee. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 5(h) & cmt. h (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 10 & cmts. a–b (1959); 1 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 5, §§ 10, 10.3,
10.4; see, e.g., Ogle v. Durley, 77 So.2d 688, 691–92 (Miss. 1955).
106
See Langbein, supra note 98; supra Part I.B–C; infra Part IV.C.
107
McNeil v. McNeil, 798 A.2d 503, 509 (Del. 2002).
108
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 13 (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 23 (1959); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402(a)(2), 7C U.L.A. 158 (Supp. 2003).
104
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dicker over the terms of the trust, such as compensation, even if in
fact they do not.109 This leads to three points.
First, when interpreting the trustee’s obligations under the trust
instrument, an intention-seeking standard is normatively desirable.110
This prescription follows from the principle that in the case of a voluntary transaction between competent adults, the joint intent of the
parties carries a presumption of Pareto optimality.111 Not surprisingly, the new Restatement (Third) of Property for donative transfers
points in this direction,112 a positive trend that is consistent with the
idea of the settlor as the dominant principal. Moreover, for the usual
transaction-costs-savings reasons, the underlying law of trust governance should supply those terms for which the majority of settlors and
trustees would have bargained if they had full information and low
negotiation costs.113 As Langbein has noted, “[t]he proper question
becomes: What was the intention of the parties to the trust deal respecting this point, and if they did not articulate their intention on
this matter, which default rule captures the likely bargain they would
have struck had they thought about it.”114
Second, given the potential informational asymmetries between
repeat-player trust lawyers and institutional fiduciaries on the one
109
See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 8, at 639, 651; see also Getzler, Legislative Incursions,
supra note 20, Art. 2, at 4 (discussing terms that professional trustees often insert into trust
instruments). Several readers of earlier drafts objected to the foregoing analysis on the
ground that, in practice, settlors simply do not dicker with trustees. But a lack of actual
bargaining between settlors and trustees does not negate the contractual nature of their
underlying relationship any more than the lack of actual bargaining between insurance
companies and insureds negates the contractual nature of that relationship. All that a lack
of bargaining suggests is that either (i) the terms of the forms used by corporate fiduciaries
approximate median preferences or (ii) the process suffers from the more common
problems of standard form contracts and disparities in party sophistication. See infra note
117 and accompanying text. Likewise, a lack of actual bargaining with amateur trustees,
such as family members, implies only that amateurs are motivated by altruism or a sense of
familial loyalty rather than fees or the other terms of the deal.
110
Langbein, supra note 8, at 663–64; see also Halbach, supra note 8, at 1881 (noting
that giving effect to the transferor’s intentions is a “pervasive theme” in recent trust law
development); cf. Hayton, supra note 20, at 96 (predicting that trust law will continue to
evolve toward further respect for the settlor’s wishes); Parkinson, supra note 20, at 676–82
(discussing the implications of an obligation-based conception of the trust).
111
See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 22–25, 145; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 80–82 (1995).
112
“The controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a donative document is the donor’s intention. The donor’s intention is given effect to the maximum extent allowed by law.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 10.1 (2003).
113
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 15.6, at 454 (6th ed. 2003);
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 38, at 89–91 (collecting scholarly statements); see also POSNER,
supra, § 4.1, at 96, § 14.3, at 413, § 14.7, at 427–28 (discussing transaction costs, interpretation, and majoritarian default rules). This is an implication of R.H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
114
Langbein, supra note 8, at 664.
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hand, and settlors on the other, there is room as a normative matter
for the occasional information-forcing default rule.115 As a positive
matter, such penalty defaults do exist. Perhaps the most salient example concerns clauses that exonerate the trustee from liability to the
beneficiaries for breach of trust. Before enforcing these clauses, especially in cases where the trustee was also the settlor’s lawyer, courts
often require a showing that the settlor had affirmative knowledge of
the clause and its meaning.116 By ensuring transparency, the rule
helps to ensure that the clause was not unwittingly embraced by the
settlor.117
Third, in contrast to the founder of a corporation or a commercial trust,118 the settlor of a donative trust receives no direct price signal about the quality of the governance arrangement to which he or
she agrees with the trustee.119 There is no public offering for beneficial interests in a donative trust, and potential beneficiaries do not
purchase their rights from the settlor. The only price signal in dona115
See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 38, at 94. The informational asymmetry between trust lawyers and settlor-clients is a separate source of agency costs, discussion of
which is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301 (2001) (discussing agency
costs between corporate clients and lawyers).
116
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222(3) & cmt. d (1959); UNIF. TRUST CODE
§ 1008(b) & cmt., 7C U.L.A. 226–27 (Supp. 2003) (“Subsection (b) responds to the danger
that the insertion of such a clause by the fiduciary or its agent may have been undisclosed
or inadequately understood by the settlor.”); 3 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 5, § 222.4, at
393–95; see also Comm. on the Modernization of the Tr. Act, Report on Exculpation Clauses in
Trust Instruments, 22 EST. TR. PENSIONS J. 55 (2003) (discussing Canadian trust law’s approach to exculpation clauses); David Hayton, English Fiduciary Standards and Trust Law, 32
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 555, 580 (1999) (describing the requirements for validity of exemption clauses under English law); Langbein, supra note 98 (describing exemption clause
disclosure rules as antifraud and intent-serving measures); Langbein, supra note 59, at
74–75 (discussing the UTC’s exculpation clause provisions).
117
In other words, unsophisticated settlors who do not read or understand the fine
print present the standard form contract problem. See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174, 1179 (1983); see also Lewis A.
Kornhauser, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1976) (suggesting
that even where exchanges are “untainted by failures in the bargaining process,” they can
still “suffer from . . . unfair clauses”). More generally, regulation of exculpatory clauses
relates back to the need to ensure clear lines of property ownership for outsiders with
whom the trustee might deal. See supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text.
118
See Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 562–63 (comparing commercial and donative
trusts).
119
Cf. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 313.
[T]he owner will bear the entire wealth effects of these expected costs so
long as the equity market anticipates these effects. Prospective minority
shareholders will realize that the owner-manager’s interests will diverge
somewhat from theirs, hence the price which they will pay for shares will
reflect the monitoring costs and the effect of the divergence between the
manger’s interest and theirs.
Id.; see also Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 570–72 (discussing the relevance of capital markets to
the governance of trusts and corporations).
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tive trusts regarding potential governance structures—the level of
compensation, if any, demanded by the trustee—is both weak and ambiguous.120 In conjunction with the potential for informational asymmetries, the lack of a direct price signal bolsters the case for the
occasional information-forcing default rule and, in some cases, possibly even justifies disregarding the expressed intent of the settlor.121
None of this is to suggest that settlors are uninterested in the
quality of the trust’s governance regime. On the contrary, a common
purpose in settling a trust in the first place, tax exigencies and controlling personalities aside,122 is to maximize the beneficiaries’ welfare.
The point of the prior paragraph is merely that settlors do not receive
the sort of price signals from thick markets that would force them to
internalize the costs and benefits of the governance arrangement to
which they have agreed with the trustee. To paraphrase the condition
posited by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel as necessary for skepticism about a term in the related context of the corporate contract,
the consequences for beneficiary welfare of the trust terms might “not
have been appreciated by” the settlor.123
D. Beneficiaries as Residual Claimants
The trustee and those who conduct business with the trustee as
trustee have fixed claims on the trust corpus that generally have priority over the claims of the beneficiaries. Trustees are free to negotiate
for their own fee schedules or other terms designed to protect their
interests,124 and those who do business with the trustee over trust assets can likewise protect themselves by contract. Beneficiaries of donative trusts, however, are limited to taking so much as the trust
instrument allows out of whatever is left of the trust’s assets when all

120
The signal is weak in both directions. Professionals often have company-wide fee
schedules, and amateurs such as family members often serve without commission. See supra
note 109.
121
See Langbein, supra note 98.
122
Anecdotes from practitioners suggest that some settlors are so control-oriented that
their chief motivation is to maintain dominance over their family after death, seeking not
just to minimize taxes, but sometimes even sacrificing that goal in order to maintain control over the beneficiaries’ behavior. See, e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim et al., The Strategic
Bequest Motive, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1045 (1985) (discussing strategic intergenerational transfers); see also infra note 208 and accompanying text.
123
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 31; see also id. at 17, 23–25; cf. Langbein,
supra note 98.
124
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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other claims are settled.125 That is, as residual claimants, they bear
the residual risk.126
To say that the beneficiaries are the residual claimants is to say
that managerial decisions are inframarginal for all the relevant players
except for the beneficiaries. This may provide an agency costs explanation for the rule in irrevocable trusts that only the beneficiaries may
sue the trustee for a breach of trust.127 The same reasoning may also
explain why the default fiduciary obligations of the trustee are designed to create incentives for the trustee to manage the trust from
the beneficiaries’ (and hence the marginal) perspective. Moreover,
now that the trust form is used for more than intergenerational conveyances and the preservation of ancestral land, status as a trust beneficiary brings both greater potential risk and greater potential
reward.128
Against the foregoing it might be argued that, because private
trust beneficiaries are nothing more than passive recipients of a donative transfer, the analogy to Jensen and Meckling’s nexus of contracts
metaphor is inappropriate. Indeed, even though acceptance (which
can be implied) is a required element of every gift,129 trust beneficiaries do not give consent to their status as such in the same way that
parties give consent to a literal contractual relationship. But the
nexus of contracts model is just that, a model. The economics of
agency provides a helpful framework for understanding the law’s default solutions to problems of governance presented by the trust form
of organization.
An important further benefit of the agency costs approach is that
it invites comparison of the trust to other organizational forms. This
expands the potential for drawing on empirical insights, albeit by
analogy. Thus far the typical trust law empirical project has been comparative. Although the common law trust is uniquely Anglo-Ameri-

125
The limitation to donative trusts is necessary because in the commercial context,
the beneficiaries are typically investors in trust certificates that, like debt, only entitle them
to a return of their investment plus interest. Any surplus value goes back to the settlor,
who is the residual claimant in such an arrangement. See Schwarcz, supra note 13, at
562–63.
126
See Fama & Jensen, Residual Claims, supra note 1, at 328 (“The residual risk—the
risk of the difference between stochastic [i.e., variable] inflows of resources and promised
payments to agents—is borne by those who contract for the rights to net cash flows.”); cf.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 67–70 (discussing the nature of residual claims in
the context of voting rights in corporations).
127
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 200 (1959); 3 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note
5, §§ 200, 200.1. But see infra Part IV.B.3.
128
See Langbein, supra note 8, at 642.
129
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 6.1 & cmt. i (2003).
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can,130 there is nontrivial variation across the common law nations.131
Furthermore, there are clear payoffs to studying how the non-common law countries have adapted to their nominal lack of an explicit
trust law.132 Because of the difficulty in obtaining good data on trusts
in practice, however, this comparative approach tends to be qualitative rather than quantitative.133 In contrast, thick capital markets provide ample data for quantitative analysis of theoretical predictions
about the impact of corporate law on shareholder welfare.134 Accordingly, analogical comparisons to the empirical literature on whether
specific corporate governance mechanisms improve investor welfare
might help inform the analysis of whether specific trust governance
mechanisms might likewise improve beneficiary welfare.
IV
APPLICATIONS

OF THE

MODEL

By reference to illustrative applications, this Part demonstrates
the positive and normative analytical power of the agency costs approach. The normative claim is that the law should minimize the
agency costs inherent in locating managerial authority with the trustee and the residual claim with the beneficiaries, but only to the extent that doing so is consistent with the ex ante instructions of the
settlor. This qualification gives priority to the settlor over the beneficiaries as the trustee’s primary principal. To return to the exemplary
trust settled by S for the benefit of B1 and B2 with T as trustee, the
claim is that T should maximize the welfare of B1 and B2, subject to
130
Note, however, that many civil law countries have long had trust-like devices. See
Richard Helmholz & Reinhard Zimmermann, Views of Trust and Treuhand: An Introduction,
in ITINERA FIDUCIAE, supra note 20, at 27, 27–31; see also Adair Dyer, International Recognition
and Adaption of Trusts: The Influence of the Hague Convention, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 989,
1013–16 (1999) (discussing the adoption of trust-like forms in civil law countries); Maurizio Lupoi, The Civil Law Trust, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 967, 971–76 (1999) (describing
various “civil trust” forms); Donovan Waters, Private Foundations (Civil Law) Versus Trusts
(Common Law), 21 EST. TR. & PENSIONS J. 281, 295–308 (2002) (same); cf. Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, The Hague Convention on Trusts: Much Ado About Very Little, 3 J. INT’L TR. & CORP.
PLAN. 5 (1994).
131
Examples are discussed infra Part IV.B.1, IV.C.2.
132
See Helmholz & Zimmermann, supra note 130, at 30–31; see also Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 6, at 435–36 (discussing increased recognition of trust-like institutions in
civil law countries and stating that “the trust is likely to become the most important contribution of the common law tradition to the European system of private law” (footnote omitted)); Langbein, supra note 8, at 669–71 (discussing “nontrust” legal systems); MAURIZIO
LUPOI, TRUSTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 267–86 (Simon Dix trans., 2000) (same); DAVID
JOHNSTON, THE ROMAN LAW OF TRUSTS (1988) (same); cf. Waters, supra note 130, at 292–83
(discussing civil law trust-like forms).
133
See Langbein, supra note 14, at 178; Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 587–88.
134
See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part I: Technique and Corporate Litigation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 141 (2002); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta
Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part II: Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, 4 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 380 (2002).
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the ex ante limits imposed by S. Consequently, the optimal solution
to the Bs-T principal-agent problem, which would be for the Bs to sell
the residual claim to T (doing so would solve both the incentive and
risk-sharing problems),135 is foreclosed by the settlor’s choice of the
trust over an outright transfer. Given the primacy of honoring the
settlor’s intentions, the best that the law of trust governance can hope
for is a second-best solution to the Bs-T agency problem.136
The positive claim is that, at least with respect to traditional doctrines, the law conforms to the suggested normative approach. As Edward Halbach, the Reporter for the new Restatement (Third) of Trusts
recently observed, a “theme” in modern trust law “is flexibility and
efficiency in the pursuit of the best interests of trust beneficiaries
within the settlor’s legally permissible objectives.”137
A. Donative Beneficiaries as Residual Claimants
Agency cost analysis prompts the classification of donative trust
beneficiaries as residual claimants.138 Claims on the assets of the trust
by all the other relevant parties—most notably the trustee and those
with whom the trustee transacts as trustee—are usually set by express
contract and have a higher priority than the beneficiaries’ claims.
Like the residual claimants in any other organizational form, donative
trust beneficiaries therefore bear the residual risk of good or bad performance. Managerial decisions regarding the trust’s assets are inframarginal to all but the beneficiaries. The emergence of the
managerial trust, moreover, has enlarged the range of the beneficiaries’ potential risk and reward.139 In this respect, modern trust
beneficiaries are beginning more closely to resemble the residual
135
See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 67, at 482–83. This assumes that T is either riskneutral or at least less risk-averse than the Bs. See infra Part IV.A.3.
136
This solution is second best from the perspective of the beneficiaries ex post.
American law, however, is more concerned with the ex ante perspective of the settlor. The
normative analysis therefore assumes that the goal is to maximize the expected utility of
the settlor. The settlor’s expected utility, in turn, is assumed to depend on the settlor’s
(paternalistic) view of the beneficiaries’ expected utility. Further exposition of this point,
including development of a formal model, is beyond the scope of this Article. Note, however, that there are numerous complexities that surround this issue, including the relevance of the beneficiaries’ own view of their utilities—something to which, as we shall see,
English law gives greater attention. See infra notes 211–17 and accompanying text. For
further discussion of the economics of altruism and deferred gifts, see, for example, ERIC
A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 55–62 (2000); Louis Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts,
58 J. PUB. ECON. 469 (1995); Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6
J. LEG. STUD. 411 (1977); Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Altruism and Deferred Gifts,
20 J. LEG. STUD. 401 (1991); sources cited in infra note 196.
137
Halbach, supra note 8, at 1881.
138
See supra Part III.D.
139
See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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claimants of other organizational forms than the trust beneficiaries of
yore.
Yet today’s prototypical donative trust beneficiaries have some interesting characteristics, relevant to reckoning the probable intent of
the settlor, that distinguish them from the residual claimants of other
organizational forms. In view of these characteristics and the relevant
agency cost analysis, this section explains the operation of three rules
of private trust governance as consistent with the likely preferences of
the parties. These distinguishing characteristics therefore reflect important empirical assumptions that underpin the hypothetical bargain
encoded in traditional trust doctrine.140 When choosing an organizational form, one looks for the form in which the default empirical
assumptions about risk-preferences, the number of residual claimants,
and other relevant factors most closely resemble one’s own situation.
Doing so minimizes the transaction costs of customizing the form to
fit one’s particular needs.141
1. The Duty of Impartiality
Trust law facilitates the creation of residual claimants with interests adverse to each other. The still classic example, here described
with reference to the exemplary trust first discussed in the Introduction, is a trust for the lifetime income benefit of one party (B1) with
the remainder principal benefit to another (B2). As residual claimants, the overall interests of B1 and B2 are grossly aligned on matters
such as self-dealing or embezzlement by T. But often their specific
interests in the day-to-day management of the trust will not be congruent. The most obvious example is that B1 should prefer income-producing investments while B2 should prefer capital appreciation.142
This creates “conflicts among the claim holders of different states because alternative decisions shift payoffs across states and benefit some
claim holders at the expense of others.”143
Trust law’s amenability to residual claimants with adverse interests poses a challenge for crafting an effective governance regime, because the preference set of the residual claimants, in whose interests
140
Cf. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499 (2002) (noting some of the empirical assumptions that
underpin various corporate law doctrines).
141
See, e.g., Ogus, supra note 3, at 187.
142
See, e.g., Dennis v. R.I. Hosp. Trust Nat’l Bank, 744 F.2d 893, 895–96 (1st Cir. 1984)
(holding that a trustee acted improperly in favoring the income beneficiaries over the
remainder beneficiaries); Dobris, supra note 20, at 569–71 (noting that the Uniform Principal and Income Act “created a meaningful principal and income problem for a number of
trustees”); see also Joel C. Dobris, Why Trustee Investors Often Prefer Dividends to Capital Gain
and Debt Investments to Equity—A Daunting Principal and Income Problem, 32 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 255 (1997) (discussing the tension between income and remainder beneficiaries).
143
Fama & Jensen, Residual Claims, supra note 1, at 329.
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the trust should be managed, may not be coherent. Corporate law, by
comparison, assumes that all shareholders share the basic aim of
profit maximization (their preferences are said to be “single-peaked”).
This assumption elides the problems of agenda manipulation and
cycling.144
Trust law’s evolutionary response for aggregating the otherwise
conflicting interests of different classes of beneficiaries is the fiduciary
duty of impartiality.145 This duty requires the trustee to “act impartially in investing, managing, and distributing the trust property, giving due regard to the beneficiaries’ respective interests.”146 Thus,
under the default arrangement, T cannot justify an action as benefiting B1 or B2 exclusively. Instead, T must justify her decisions in relation to the aggregate welfare of B1 and B2 as a class. The trust’s
residual claimants’ interests are made coherent in effect by directing
the trustee to act with a view to their needs rather than their individual wants; balance is the overarching directive of the duty of
impartiality.147
This appears consistent with the settlor’s probable intent. True,
in the foregoing example one might argue that S rated B1’s position
as superior to B2’s because S gave B1 an immediate benefit but gave
B2 only the remainder on the death of B1. But that seems a thin basis
for concluding that S wanted T to prefer the interests of B1 over the
interests of B2. If S had such a preference, it would have been simple
enough to put something to that effect in the trust instrument. In the
absence of such language, given the gratuitous basis of the traditional
private trust, we assume that S wanted T to exercise discretion in balancing the interests of the named beneficiaries, favoring B1 or B2
only if the later context justified doing so.148 This stands in contrast
to the law of corporations, which requires managers to favor the
144
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 395, 405–06 (1983); Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous
Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599, 1611–12 (1989); Robert H.
Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1110 n.28 (2002).
145
See Halbach, supra note 8, at 1912–13.
146
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 803, 7C U.L.A. 204 (Supp. 2003); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 183, 232 (1959).
147
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227 cmts. c & i
(1992); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Significant Trends in the Trust Law of the United States, 32
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 531, 549 (1999) [hereinafter Halbach, Significant Trends]; Edward
C. Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement, 27 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
407, 441–44 (1992) [hereinafter Halbach, Trust Investment]; Halbach, supra note 8, at 1913.
148
Thus, balance does not require equal treatment. In fact, the trustee “has considerable discretion in preserving the balance between the beneficiaries.” 3A SCOTT ON TRUSTS,
supra note 5, § 232, at 7. For example, T could lawfully tip the balance in favor of B1 if B1
was S’s widow and B2 was a distant cousin. “There is . . . no absolute rule on this matter
and under some circumstances [favoring the life or remainder beneficiaries] might be
justified.” Id.

R

R

R

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

\\server05\productn\C\CRN\89-3\CRN302.txt

652

unknown

Seq: 32

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

27-FEB-04

9:29

[Vol. 89:621

claimant with the most residual claim in the case of conflict,149 though
of course within the same class of stock all shareholders must be
treated equally.150 Trust law’s duty of impartiality applies both within
and across beneficiary classes.
From this perspective the duty of impartiality is both a critical
feature of trust governance and a salient distinguishing characteristic
of trust law as organizational law. It is critical, because without it often
there would be no coherent set of residual claimants in whose interests the trust’s managers should operate. And it is a salient distinguishing characteristic, relevant to choice of form for commercial
transactions,151 because the duty is not an explicit part of the default
fiduciary obligation in most other organizational forms.
Courts therefore have considerable experience in applying trust
law to the problem of balancing the interests of residual claimants of
different classes. Especially for commercial transactions, this might be
a reason to choose the deal reflected within trust law’s default governance regime over those offered by the default governance arrangements of other organizations.152 As Steven Schwarcz has explained,
one “should consider using the trust form of business organization
where residual claimants do not expect management to favor their
class of claims over senior claimants.”153
2. Total Return Investing
The modern trend toward total return investing complements
the duty of impartiality.154 Motivated by the teachings of modern
portfolio theory,155 total return investing has been codified in the re149
See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 46 (3d Cir. 1947); BAINBRIDGE,
supra note 1, § 7.4, at 342; ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 14.5, at 636 (1986).
150
The clearest application of this principle is the rule against non-pro-rata distributions, which prevents controlling shareholders from favoring themselves. See, e.g., Sinclair
Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721–22 (Del. 1971); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, § 7.4, at
338–42.
151
See Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 575–80.
152
Reasoning along similar lines, Fischel and Langbein have suggested “that the duty
of impartiality should be imported into pension law” as a response to the frequency of
adverse interests among pension fund beneficiaries. Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein,
ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1121
(1988). Courts have followed this suggestion. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK,
PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 680, 848 (3d ed. 2000).
153
Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 579.
154
See, e.g., Lyman W. Welch, Brave New World of Total Return Laws, TR. & EST., June
2002, at 24.
155
See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN FINANCIAL THEORY
17–31(2d ed. 1998). For early applications to trust-investment law, see Gordon, supra note
12; BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN RULE
(1986); John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law,
1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1; John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and
Trust-Investment Law: II, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1; see also Harvey E. Bines, Modern Portfo-
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cent revisions to the prudent investor standards that underpin trust
law’s fiduciary duty of care.156 The basic idea is that trustees should
craft a diversified portfolio in light of its balance of overall (rather
than investment-specific) risk and potential return.157 A contemporaneous reform, which revised the definitions of “principal” and “income,” made the boundary between the two porous.158 Together,
total return investing and more flexible definitions of principal and
income have the potential to ease the tension between lifetime and
remainder beneficiaries by refocusing the trustee’s balancing of their
interests on a more transparent margin—namely, the allocation to
“principal” or “income” of the trust’s total return receipts.159
The 1997 Uniform Principal and Income Act refocuses the tension between capital appreciation and present income production on
the trustee’s ex post power to adjust the classification of specific investment returns within the total return portfolio as income or principal.160 The so-called unitrust,161 which is an alternative to equitable
adjustment that provides a specified percentage of the trust corpus
each year to the income beneficiaries with the remainder left for the
“principal” beneficiaries,162 likewise eases the tension between capital
appreciation and income production.
lio Theory and Investment Management Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 721
(1976) (discussing portfolio theory in the context of investment management).
156
See Halbach, Significant Trends, supra note 147, at 546; Langbein, supra note 91; see
also Joel C. Dobris, Speculations on the Idea of “Speculation” in Trust Investing: An Essay, 39
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. (forthcoming 2004) (discussing the role of “speculation” modern trust-investment law).
157
See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT §§ 2–3, 7B U.L.A. 289–98 (2000); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227(a) (1992); see also John H. Langbein,
The New American Trust-Investment Act, 8 TOLLY’S TR. L. INT’L 123, 123–24 (1994). Damages
in surcharge actions for imprudence should likewise reflect the total return imperative. See
Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 583–87.
158
UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT (1997 Act), 7B U.L.A. 131 (2000).
159
See Halbach, supra note 8, at 1913–14; see also Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor
Act, supra note 91, at 666–69 (discussing the tension between modern investment theories
and traditional distinctions between principal and income). For further economically-informed discussion of principal and income, see Gordon, supra note 12, at 99–112.
160
UNIF. PRINCIPAL & INCOME ACT (1997 Act) §§ 103–04, 7B U.L.A. 139–43 (2000). See
generally Joel C. Dobris, New Forms of Private Trusts for the Twenty-First Century—Principal and
Income, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1 (1996) (proposing means to alleviate tension between conflicting beneficiary interests); Joel C. Dobris, The Probate World at the End of the
New Century: Is a New Principal and Income Act in Your Future?, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
393 (1993) (discussing proposed reforms to principal and income allocation rules).
161
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3527 (2001); N.Y. ESTATE POWERS & TRUSTS LAW
§ 11–2.4 (McKinney Supp. 2004).
162
See, e.g., Jerold I. Horn, Prudent Investor Rule, Modern Portfolio Theory, and Private
Trusts: Drafting and Administration Including the “Give-Me-Five” Unitrust, 33 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 1, 30–33, 36–46 (1998); Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra note 91,
at 669; Robert B. Wolf, Total Return Trusts—Can Your Clients Afford Anything Less?, 33 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 131 (1998); cf. Joel C. Dobris, Real Return, Modern Portfolio Theory, and
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With equitable adjustment or a unitrust, the higher the total return, the better all the beneficiaries do.163 The unitrust does so with
less discretion and so a reduced potential for agency costs. But it less
perfectly aligns the interests of the income and principal beneficiaries, because a disproportionate share of the potential upside from
higher risk investments will accrue to the principal beneficiaries. Equitable adjustment somewhat better aligns the beneficiaries’ interests,
but it increases the potential for agency costs ex post because it gives
the trustee additional discretion ex ante. Still, the exercise of this discretion is more transparent than the traditional approach of hiding
the problem behind the portfolio’s initial allocation between incomeproducing and capital-appreciating investments.
In any of its forms, the trend toward total return investing, like
the duty of impartiality, can be understood as the sort of agency-costsminimizing rules to which the parties probably would have agreed had
bargaining been feasible. Indeed, before these reforms, opting out of
the prior prudent investor standards was not uncommon in professionally drafted instruments.164 Authorization for the trustee to invade principal for the benefit of the income beneficiaries was also not
uncommon.165
3. Risk Tolerance and the Duty of Care
In the paradigmatic donative trust, the residual claimants are risk
averse (imagine widows and orphans). Because there is no well-developed market for beneficial interests in trusts,166 the beneficiaries cannot easily diversify, and when diversification is unavailable, the
standard economic assumption is that of risk averseness.167 Owing to
the trend toward professional trustees, however, the typical modern
trustee—whether a sophisticated individual, such as a trust lawyer, or
an institution, such as a bank—is likely to be less risk averse than the
typical beneficiary.168 Corporate trustees are by definition risk neutral
College, University, and Foundation Decisions on Annual Spending from Endowments: A Visit to the
World of Spending Rules, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 49 (1993).
163
See generally MACEY, supra note 155, at 77–80 (describing the advantages of a more
flexible trust-investment law).
164
See POSNER, supra note 113, § 15.6, at 455; Getzler, Legislative Incursions, supra note
20, Art. 2, at 3–4; Gordon, supra note 12, at 75–76 & n.99.
165
See, e.g., Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. N.Y. City Cancer Comm., 144 A.2d 535, 538–37
(Conn. 1958) (holding that the trust instrument authorized the trustee to invade principal
for the income beneficiary).
166
See infra note 278 and accompanying text.
167
See VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS, supra note 67, at 228; Eisenhardt, supra
note 67, at 60–61. Behavioral studies are critical of this assumption. See, e.g., Nicholas
Barberis & Ming Huang, Mental Accounting, Loss Aversion, and Individual Stock Returns, 56 J.
FIN. 1247, 1254 (2001).
168
Note, however, that the individual agents of an institutional fiduciary who are assigned to manage a particular trust are likely to be risk-averse. But this is an agency prob-
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(this is the standard assumption for business organizations), and individual trustees are able to diversify and in some cases are even able to
insure against loss.169
This is not to suggest that trustees are indifferent to risk or that
beneficiaries will never prefer aggressive portfolios and high-risk investments. Rather, the point concerns the relative discounts, if any,
that the parties assign to expected values in the face of uncertainty.170
The basic intuition is that individuals who cannot diversify have a distaste for volatility and prefer instead lower expected returns with less
risk of a substantial loss. This is true even if the probability that the
substantial loss will materialize is relatively small. The more risk
averse an investor is, the more likely the investor will prefer a smaller
but certain sum (say, $100) over the chance to obtain a larger sum
(say, $200) even if the larger sum, when discounted by its probability
(say, 60%), is still larger than the smaller but certain sum (here $120
versus $100).
The disparity in the trustee’s and the beneficiaries’ attitudes toward risk that stems from this institutional design poses a challenge
for trust governance.171 In the absence of the fiduciary obligation or
other corrective mechanisms, trustees would often be less averse to
volatility than the beneficiaries.172 Trust law’s particular flavor of the
fiduciary duty of care can be understood as an answer to this challenge.173 Care in trust law is the functional equivalent of the objective
reasonable person standard in tort law.174 The trustee must “exercise
such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in

lem within the institution’s organizational structure, and analysis of that problem is beyond
the scope of this Article.
169
Legal malpractice insurance, for example, is available with coverage for negligence
in fiduciary administration.
170
Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen’s textbook provides a clear introductory explanation of this concept. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 49–55 (4th
ed. 2004); see also VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS, supra note 67, at 224–29.
171
Agency relationships, in other words, present both incentive and risk-sharing
problems. See, e.g., Eisenhardt, supra note 67, at 58.
172
Commissions are often set as a percentage of the trust corpus. See, e.g., N.Y. SURR.
CT. PROC. ACT § 2309 (McKinney 1997); Langbein, supra note 8, at 639, 651. There is,
however, an emerging trend, supported by academics, toward a reasonable compensation
standard. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 15681 (West 1991); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 38
(2003); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 708, 7C U.L.A. 197 (Supp. 2003); Halbach, supra note 8, at
1909. See generally VOLLMAR ET AL., supra note 101, at 1059 (describing various compensation schemes); Gordon, supra note 12, at 82–83 (discussing trustee compensation).
173
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 425, 437 (1993).
174
See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 1 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 287 (2000); Langbein, supra
note 8, at 656. See generally Cooter & Freedman, supra note 69, at 105–58 (comparing
“reasonable” care in tort and fiduciary law).
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dealing with his own property.”175 This duty counsels caution, which
is what undiversified, risk-averse beneficiaries would prefer. Accordingly, the frequent observation that portfolio management by trustees
in practice is overly cautious likely reflects some combination of too
much deterrence from the duty of care and a selection effect in the
initial choice of cautious trustees by the settlor.176
The contrast between the operation of the duty of care in trust
law and in corporate law is instructive.177 In corporate law, the business judgment rule requires deference to the ordinary business decisions of management unless they are tainted by a conflict of interest
or are so unreasonable as to amount to gross negligence.178 This is a
loose constraint,179 but the business judgment rule is justifiable from
an agency costs perspective in view of the different context in which it
operates. Corporate law draws from portfolio theory a paradigmatic
shareholder who is diversified.180 And diversified (risk-neutral) shareholders are advantaged by the business judgment rule because insulating managers from liability in the absence of egregious conduct helps
175
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227 cmt. d (1992). See generally Joshua Getzler, Duty of
Care, in BREACH OF TRUST 41 (Peter Birks & Arianna Pretto eds., 2002) (discussing the
development of the duty of care in English law).
176
See, e.g., Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 11, at 1335 (“Trustees have long been risk
averse, conservative investors.”). Conservatism might also stem from the common law rule
of unanimity in trustee decisionmaking. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 28, at
918; Ogus, supra note 3, at 209–10. This lends support to the rejection of the unanimity
requirement by the Uniform Trust Code, see § 703, 7C U.L.A. 191 (Supp. 2003), and by the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, see § 39 (2003), as does the observation that in practice many
drafters likewise reject the unanimity requirement. There has been considerable statutory
activity in this area. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 39 rep. note cmt. a (2003);
UNIF. TRUSTEE’S POWERS ACT § 6(a), 7C U.L.A. 429 (2000); DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra
note 28, at 918 n.5.
177
See Gordon, supra note 12, at 94–96; Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 574–79.
178
See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 & n.66 (Del. 2000); BAINBRIDGE, supra
note 1, § 6.4, at 269–83. The United Kingdom has in practice, though admittedly not in
name, something of a business judgment rule. See BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE, AND OPERATION 313 (1997).
179
Of course, one must be careful about accepting doctrinal labels as conclusive on
the issue of whether prudence in trust law and business judgment in corporate law beget
different outcomes. There is ample authority for deferential review of trustee decisionmaking, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959), and the business judgment rule is not an abdication of the judicial function by the courts. Cf. Stephen M.
Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine 6–9, 14–19 (Univ. of Cal.,
L.A., Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Series, Working Paper No. 03-18, 2003), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=429260. Still, the different emphases in the canonical statements are telling. Further, even though numerous courts have found a breach of the duty
of care by a trustee, see, e.g., 2A SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 5, § 174, cases holding that a
manager of a publicly-traded corporation breached the duty of care are almost nonexistent. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, §§ 6.2, 6.4; ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 10,
§ 8.4.2, at 254.
180
See, e.g., WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE 120 (5th ed. 2003).
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offset the managers’ incentives—including large investments of
human capital and personal wealth in the firm—to avoid risk.181
Trust law, in contrast, assumes that the beneficiaries are not diversified, so the trustee’s default duty of care is set at the more restrictive reasonable person standard. Viewed in this manner, the different
understandings of the duty of care in corporate and trust law reflect
different expectations regarding internal and external diversification.182 In donative trusts diversification for the residual claimants is
usually obtained internally.183
Of course, given their other holdings, some beneficiaries might
be diversified irrespective of the trust portfolio. For this reason modern prudent investor standards require the trustee to consider the risk
tolerance of the trust’s particular beneficiaries in crafting the trust
portfolio.184 Young scions of great wealth can better absorb higher
volatility than elderly widows of modest means. So a “trust whose
main purpose is to support an elderly widow of modest means will
have a lower risk tolerance than a trust to accumulate for a young
scion of great wealth.”185
B. The Settlor-Beneficiary Tension
In light of the agency cost considerations on both sides, this section explores four examples of how the law balances the ex post preferences of the beneficiaries with the ex ante wishes of the settlor.
Consider once again the exemplary trust presented above, which was
181
See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1982); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1,
§ 6.3, at 259–63; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 93–102; Peter V. Letsou, Implications of Shareholder Diversification on Corporate Law and Organization: The Case of the Business
Judgment Rule, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 179, 182 (2001).
182
For a complementary analysis, see Rock & Wachter, supra note 2, at 652–71. Note
also that managerial decisions regarding a portfolio of liquid assets are easier to monitor
than decisions regarding net present value of a corporation’s operating assets. See Macey,
supra note 3, at 317-19; Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 6, at 477. Exogenous factors impact the results of the latter, whereas the former can be compared to the performance of a
hypothetical prudent portfolio, thereby netting out secular market trends. For further discussion and references, see Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 583–87.
183
Hence the trustee’s duty to diversify the trust portfolio. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 3, 7B U.L.A. 296–98 (2000); Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra
note 91, at 646–49; Halbach, Trust Investment, supra note 147, at 424–45; see also In re Estate
of Janes, 681 N.E.2d 332 (N.Y. 1997) (holding that a fiduciary may be surcharged for an
imprudent lack of diversification).
184
See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2, 7B U.L.A. 289–90 (2000); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227 cmt. e (1992); Halbach, Trust Investment, supra note 147, at 436–37, 444–45; Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra
note 91, at 650.
185
UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 291 (2000); see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227(a) (1992). See generally Ogus, supra
note 3, at 196 (“The diversification objective of individuals will reflect their degree of riskaversion.”).

R
R

R

R

R

R

R
R

R

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

\\server05\productn\C\CRN\89-3\CRN302.txt

658

unknown

Seq: 38

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

27-FEB-04

9:29

[Vol. 89:621

settled by S for the benefit of B1 and B2 (collectively the “Bs”) with T
as trustee. The nub of the problem is that the Bs bear the marginal
costs and benefits of T’s managerial decisions, but the ex ante preferences of S trump the later wishes of the Bs in guiding T’s management.186 A variant of the well-known dead hand problem (which is
perhaps a pejorative aphorism for the idea that the settlor’s intent
controls),187 this tension has been exacerbated by the modern trend
toward the use of the trust as a vehicle for asset management by professionals. The modern managerial trust vests greater discretion in
the hands of the trustee, which broadens the range of the trustee’s
hidden action. Moreover, the ongoing erosion of the Rule Against
Perpetuities is expanding the temporal scope of the trustee’s discretionary authority and hence the likelihood of later circumstances unanticipated by the settlor.188
1. Modification and Termination
A useful example of the potential for divergent interests between
the settlor and the beneficiaries involves the possibility of the beneficiaries seeking premature termination of the trust. This problem includes the issue of whether the beneficiaries can obtain judicial
modification of the trust’s terms, because the power to terminate subsumes the power to modify.189 The American rule, which originated
with Claflin v. Claflin,190 is unfriendly to termination and modifica186

See Ogus, supra note 3, at 214–16.
There is a considerable literature on the dead hand problem. See, e.g., RONALD
CHESTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTH AND SOCIETY passim (1982); POSNER, supra note 113, § 18.3,
at 518–20; Alexander, supra note 20, at 1254–64; Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3; Gareth H.
Jones, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 119
(Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of Testamentary Restraints on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
1273.
188
See LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 900–01, 1251–52 (3d ed. 2002); Dukeminier &
Krier, supra note 11, at 1327–35; Sterk, supra note 3, at 2111–14; see also Richard A. Epstein,
Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667 (1986)
(discussing temporal uncertainty and property law). An interesting question is whether
private trusts might soon face the sort of dead-hand problems that are familiar in charitable trusts, as the latter have long been exempt from the Rule Against Perpetuities. See, e.g.,
POSNER, supra note 113, § 18.4, at 520; Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Limiting Dead Hand Control of
Charitable Trusts: Expanding the Use of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 353, 356
(1999); Macey, supra note 3, at 300–06.
189
Cf. 2 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 5, § 107.3, at 124–25 (discussing removal of
trustee by beneficiaries). Note, however, that the relevant considerations for modification
versus termination are not entirely the same. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65
cmt. f (2003). In practice, termination usually pits the current against the remainder beneficiaries whereas modification usually touches only the settlor/beneficiary tension.
190
20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 cmt. a (2003).
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tion.191 Under the Claflin doctrine, a trust may be terminated prematurely only with the settlor’s consent or, in the absence of the settlor’s
consent, if termination would not frustrate a “material purpose” of the
trust.192 Settlor’s consent, however, is by definition unavailable when
dealing with testamentary trusts, and courts have had little difficulty
finding a “material purpose” that would be offended by a modification
or termination.193 Thus, as a practical matter, unless the trustee consents,194 American trusts are difficult to amend or terminate once established. Even if all the competent beneficiaries and the trustee were
inclined to strike a deal, the frequency of unidentified or minor beneficiaries reduces the viability of this alternative.
The upshot of the Claflin doctrine is that it helps align the interests of the settlor and the trustee. The rule allows the trustee to preserve the settlor’s original design, regardless of the beneficiaries’
wishes, which is what the settlor likely would have wanted. The settlor,
after all, chose a trust rather than an outright transfer or another organizational form.195 Thus the Claflin doctrine is consistent with the
model of the settlor as the primary principal. Moreover, though a
particular beneficiary might prefer the power to terminate the trust
once it is established, the Claflin doctrine is advantageous to potential
beneficiaries as a class because it increases the willingness of grantors
to create a trust in the first place.196 The idea is that, in the aggregate,
beneficiaries fare better with more trusts, and thus more gifting,197
191
See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 11, at 1328 (observing that, under Claflin, “termination or modification by a court[ ] is only grudgingly available”).
192
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 & cmt. a (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 337 (1959); 4 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 5, §§ 337–340.2.
193
See generally 4 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 5, §§ 337.1–337.8 (collecting and
describing cases). For a specific example, see In re Estate of Brown, 528 A.2d 752, 755 (Vt.
1987) (“We believe that the settlor’s intention to assure a life-long income to [the beneficiaries] would be defeated if termination of the trust were allowed.”).
194
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 342 (1959); ROGER W. ANDERSEN, UNDERSTANDING TRUSTS AND ESTATES 110–111 (3d ed. 2003); 4 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 5,
§ 342, at 529–32.
195
Cf. Langbein, supra note 8, at 632 (“The donor who structures a gift in this way
expects compensating advantages.”).
196
That the trust is less easily modified than a contract might help solve the so-called
Samaritan’s dilemma. Because of its rigidity ex post, the trust provides a mechanism for
the parties to commit to a particular donative structure. On the Samaritan’s dilemma and
related issues, see James M. Buchanan, The Samaritan’s Dilemma, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY,
AND ECONOMIC THEORY 71–85 (Edmund S. Phelps ed., 1975); Ogus, supra note 3, at 189;
Shavell, supra note 136, at 402, 406–08, 419; Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing
Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1276–83 (1980); Posner,
supra note 136, at 412–13. If S is willing to transfer resources to B, but B anticipates that S
will do so, then B might behave more recklessly because S has provided a safety net. For
further discussion of altruism and deferred gifts from an economic perspective, see also
sources cited in supra note 136.
197
The further assumption here is that in the absence of these rules, the overall volume of gifting would fall. If the level of overall gifting remained constant, then benefi-
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albeit with potentially greater managerial agency costs, than they
would fare with fewer trusts, albeit with reduced potential for managerial agency costs.
The downside of the Claflin doctrine is that it entrenches the trustee and locks in a certain minimal level of beneficiary-trustee agency
costs. Under the classic American approach, even if all the beneficiaries are identifiable adults who would be better off if the trust were
terminated (perhaps because its consequent administrative expenses
would be eliminated), the trustee need not assent to their wishes.
Against the rule, therefore, it might be argued that the fundamental
decision whether or not to continue the trust is not in the hands of
those who bear the marginal costs and benefits of that decision.
At its most extreme, this criticism amounts to nothing more than
a statement that the beneficiaries cannot override the settlor’s choice
of form. As suggested above, however, the doctrine rests on the assumption that all the relevant parties fare better in the aggregate if
settlors are allowed to bind the beneficiaries to the trust form of organization. And yet, if we assume that settlors of today’s managerial
trusts ultimately want to maximize the welfare of the beneficiaries,
then a different rule might be preferable—especially in view of the
ongoing erosion of the Rule Against Perpetuities and hence the increasing temporal durability of modern trusts.198 On this view, onetime settlors do not know to opt out of the default Claflin regime,
perhaps because their advisors are failing to call this to their attention
(an altogether different agency problem199) or they did not obtain
expert advice.200
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that there is a strong academic
and slowly emerging decisional trend toward liberalizing these
rules.201 As in the classic (if then extraordinary) Pulitzer case,202
courts are beginning to show a willingness to authorize deviation from
the settlor’s specific instructions that, over time, conflict with the setciaries might fare better without the rule, provided that the alternative modes of transfer
imposed fewer restrictions. But with fewer restrictions, these alternatives would be imperfect substitutes, so it is unlikely that the overall level of gifting would remain constant.
198
See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
199
See supra note 115.
200
See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 11, at 1331–32.
201
See Halbach, Significant Trends, supra note 147, at 538; Halbach, supra note 8, at
1899–1901; see, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 15409 (West 1991); see also Gail Boreman Bird, Trust
Termination: Unborn, Living, and Dead Hands—Too Many Fingers in the Trust Pie, 36 HASTINGS
L.J. 563 (1985) (suggesting reforms to increase flexibility of trusts over time); Ronald
Chester, Modification and Termination of Trusts in the 21st Century: The Uniform Trust Code
Leads a Quiet Revolution, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 697 (2001) (arguing that the increase
in long-term trusts requires loosening of the rules of modification and termination).
202
In re Pulitzer’s Estate, 249 N.Y.S. 87 (Sur. Ct. 1931), aff’d mem., 260 N.Y.S. 975 (App.
Div. 1932). For further discussion of Pulitzer, see Langbein, supra note 98.
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tlor’s assumed broader aim of benefiting the beneficiaries.203 Certainly the recent Uniform Trust Code and Restatement (Third) of Trusts
embrace this view.204 In fact, they extend it to the power of “equitable
deviation”—the idea that courts should permit modification of even
the dispositive instructions of the trust instrument in light of circumstances not anticipated by the settlor.205 Likewise, there is burgeoning
authority, perfectly sensible from an agency-costs contractarian perspective, for trust modifications where tax exigencies arise after the
settlor establishes the trust.206
Note, however, that these liberalizations are designed to advance
the settlors’ probable intent.207 If, at the time of the trust’s creation, a
particular type of tax savings was not possible, then the reasonable
assumption is that the settlor would want the trust later modified to
minimize taxes in light of subsequent changes to the tax law.208 Similarly, the typical settlor would want the court to modify even the distributive provisions of the trust when, as a result of unanticipated
circumstances, the settlor’s prior regime is no longer sensible.209 Re203
See, e.g., In re Trusteeship Agreement with Mayo, 105 N.W.2d 900, 91 (Minn. 1960);
Carnahan v. Johnson, 711 N.E.2d 1093, 1096–98 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS rep. note § 66 cmt. b (2003) (collecting illustrative authority); ROGER
W. ANDERSEN & IRA MARK BLOOM, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 8.04, at 392 (2d
ed. 2002).
204
See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 410–12, 7C U.L.A. 164–68 (Supp. 2003); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 65–66 (2003); In re Harris Testamentary Trust, 69 P.3d 1109,
1114–20 (Kan. 2003) (upholding various reformations and modifications under the Kansas
adoption of the UTC); Chester, supra note 201, at 724–28; Dukeminier & Krier, supra note
11, at 1329–31; English, supra note 98, at 27–28; David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code
(2000): Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 169–76 (2002); Julia C.
Walker, Get Your Dead Hands Off Me: Beneficiaries’ Right to Terminate or Modify a Trust Under
the Uniform Trust Code, 67 MO. L. REV. 443, 459–62 (2002).
205
See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412, 7C U.L.A. 167 (Supp. 2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 66 & cmt. a (2003); Halbach, supra note 8, at 1900–01; cf. N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 7–1.6(b) (McKinney 2002); Paul G. Haskell, Justifying the Principle of Distributive Deviation in the Law of Trusts, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 267, 294 (1967) (arguing in favor of
flexibility to modify dispositive trust terms that would cause hardship without modification); Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Missouri’s Repeal of the Claflin Doctrine—New View of the Policy
Against Perpetuities?, 50 MO. L. REV. 805 (1985) (analyzing recent statutory reforms).
206
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 12.2 & rep. note (2003) (stating the rule and collecting authority); UNIF. TRUST CODE
§ 416, 7C U.L.A. 171 (Supp. 2003); see also 2A SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 5, § 167, at 281
n.27 & 2003 Supp. at 329–34 (collecting authority); Halbach, supra note 8, at 1887; cf. Mary
Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA L. REV. 611, 613 (1988) (arguing that
courts should construe intent by reference to “competent estate planning techniques”).
207
See Langbein, supra note 59, at 68–69.
208
The qualification allows for the scenario in which the settlor opts for a less taxefficient trust in order to maintain more control—for example, the use of a nonexempt
generation-skipping trust.
209
These liberalizations are therefore different from reformation (which the English
call rectification of documents in equity). See In re Harris Testamentary Trust, 69 P.3d
1109, 1114 (Kan. 2003) (distinguishing reformation and modification); Langbein, supra
note 59, at 69 (describing reformation and rectification). Reformation conforms the docu-
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turning to the exemplary trust described above, settled by S for the
benefit of B1 and B2, the supposition is that S would have preferred to
favor B2 over B1 if subsequent to settling the trust the former was
disabled in an accident while the business of the latter proved unusually successful.210 All of these liberalizations, if understood as designed to effect a substituted judgment for what the settlor would have
wanted, are consistent with a model of the trust in which the settlor is
the primary principal. These liberalizing trends fulfill the beneficiaries’ desires, but only when doing so would approximate what the
settlor would have wanted. They add the nuance of a standard, as it
were, to the hard-edged Claflin rule.
The more liberal English approach, in contrast, reflects a different dead-hand calculus. The leading English case on the question of
premature termination, Saunders v. Vautier,211 reaches the opposite result from Claflin.212 Beneficiaries of English trusts, if they are all identifiable adults, can force the premature termination of a trust over the
dissent of the trustee.213 Indeed, owing not only to Saunders but also
(and even more clearly) to the Variation of Trusts Act of 1958,214 English law resolves significantly more of the settlor-beneficiary tension
raised by questions of trust termination and modification in favor of

ment to what was actually intended at the time of execution. The innovation here is the
extension of the reformation concept to testamentary trusts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 & cmt. a (2003); UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 415, 7C U.L.A. 171 (Supp. 2003); see, e.g., Pond v. Pond, 678 N.E.2d 1321, 1324
(Mass. 1997) (reforming trust where settlor’s intent was frustrated by drafting error).
210
For an example of the traditional, contrary approach, see In re Stuchell, 801 P.2d
852, 854 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (refusing to modify a trust so as to preserve a disabled beneficiary’s eligibility for public assistance on the ground that the modification’s “only purpose
. . . [was] to make the trust more advantageous to the beneficiaries”). But see Macey, supra
note 3, at 300–02 (defending narrower interpretations of settlor’s intent).
211
49 Eng. Rep. 282 (1841); see also Goulding v. James, 2 All E.R. 239, 247 (C.A. 1997)
(“The principle recognises the rights of beneficiaries, who are sui juris and together absolutely entitled to the trust property, to exercise their proprietary rights to overbear and
defeat the intention of a testator or settlor to subject property to the continuing trusts,
powers and limitations of a will or trust instrument.”).
212
For a comparative discussion of Saunders and Claflin in their historical context, see
Alexander, supra note 20, at 1200–04.
213
See D.J. HAYTON, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 93–96 (3d ed. 1998); MOFFAT ET AL., supra
note 20, at 249–52.
214
VARIATION OF TRUSTS ACT, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 53, § 1 (Eng.). Well-drafted instruments can easily circumvent Saunders, for example by ensuring the existence of contingent
interests. The 1958 Act, however, is mandatory—and it allows for the ex post variation of
even discretionary trusts. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 11, at 1329; see also EDWARDS
& STOCKWELL, supra note 20, at 156–58 (collecting English cases which hold that settlor’s
intent is not determinative and indeed often irrelevant); MOFFAT ET AL., supra note 20, at
272 (noting the “‘triumph for the doctrine of equitable property over the doctrine of
fidelity to the settlors’ intentions’” (citation omitted)); PEARCE & STEVENS, supra note 25,
at 463–64 (same).
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the beneficiaries.215 Unlike the recent liberalizations to American
law, however, English law places little emphasis in resolving these matters on evidence of what the settlor would have wanted.216
In the English trust, therefore, the settlor is not the primary principal and the settlor’s interests are subordinated to the goal of minimizing managerial agency costs ex post: “[A]fter the settlor’s death,
the trust is regarded as the beneficiaries’ property, not as the settlor’s
property—and the dead hand continues to rule only by the sufferance
of the beneficiaries.”217 A powerful criticism of this approach, at least
since the 1958 Act, is that it is mandatory. English settlors cannot opt
for the American or any other more restrictive approach. The Claflin
doctrine, in contrast, is default. American settlors can choose the English or any other more permissive regime.
2. Trustee Removal
The question of on what grounds beneficiaries may obtain the
removal of a trustee is another example of the potential for tension
between the interests of the settlor and those of the beneficiaries. To
return yet again to the exemplary trust discussed above, which was
settled by S for the benefit of B1 and B2 with T as trustee, the question
is when, if ever, a court will remove and replace T at the request of the
Bs.
On the one hand, an important consideration for settlors when
choosing a trustee is the trustee’s expected fidelity to the wishes of the
settlor in the future exercise of discretion. On the other hand, it is
the beneficiaries who, as residual claimants, bear the marginal costs
and benefits of the trustee’s decisions. Hence the beneficiaries have
an incentive to monitor the trustee’s performance and, under standard doctrine, only the beneficiaries have standing to bring an action
against the trustee for breach of trust.218 The difficulty, then, is setting the threshold for trustee removal high enough so that the trustee
can carry out the settlor’s wishes (including the protection of future
215
See HAYTON, supra note 213, at 174; MOFFAT ET AL., supra note 20, at 248–73; PEARCE
& STEVENS, supra note 25, at 450–66; Hayton, supra note 116, at 598–600; Jones, supra note
187, at 124–26; Ogus, supra note 3, at 202–04. See generally Chester, supra note 201, at
709–22 (discussing the history of English and American trust law). Canada is also more
liberal than the American states. See Keith B. Farquhar, Recent Themes in the Variation of
Trusts, 20 EST. TR. & PENSIONS J. 181 (2001).
216
See MOFFAT ET AL, supra note 20, at 248–57, 273–86; TODD & WILSON, supra note 20,
§ 18.3.3.3, at 434; Farquhar, supra note 215, at 186–91; sources cited supra notes 211, 21415; see also Wiedenbeck, supra note 205, at 817 (noting that Saunders permits termination
“without regard to the settlor’s purposes”).
217
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 28, at 651; cf. Jones, supra note 187, at 120
(“[American courts] have accepted the full implications of the principle that the property
is the settlor’s, even though settled on trust.”).
218
See infra Part IV.B.3.
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beneficiaries) in the teeth of a contrary preference of the current beneficiaries without setting it so high as in effect to sanction shirking or
mismanagement. The goal, in other words, is to minimize trusteebeneficiary agency costs, subject to the ex ante constraints imposed by
the settlor.
The law’s default approach authorizes courts to remove trustees
who are dishonest or who have engaged in a “serious breach of trust,”
but it does not necessarily permit removal for breaches that are not
“serious” or for simple disagreements.219 Trustees who were chosen
by the settlor, as compared to those named by a third party or a court,
are even less readily removed; there is something of a thumb on the
scale for them.220 Further, if the settlor was aware of an asserted
ground for removal at the time of naming the trustee, that ground will
not serve as a basis for the later removal of the trustee unless the trustee is entirely unfit to serve.221
These default rules appear to reflect the bargain to which the
settlor and trustee would have agreed when trusts were used predominately for the preservation of family land and when the typical trustee
was an amateur rather than a fee-paid professional.222 When the trustee’s mission was simply to hold ancestral land, there were fewer opportunities for conflict between beneficiaries and trustees (where the
agent’s tasks are fewer and are readily observable, shirking is less of a
problem). And, in the aggregate, beneficiaries fare better when settlors are comfortable establishing trusts if the alternative is that settlors would not make the transfer at all.223 Thus the traditionally high
threshold for trustee removal served the interests of the settlor while
imposing a tolerable level of agency costs on the beneficiaries.
Today, however, modern prudent investor standards allow for
greater discretion in portfolio management and the overarching aim
has shifted to maximization of total return. Consider also the apparent shift toward use of professional trustees,224 which suggests a weakened personal link between the settlor and the trustee. Both of these
developments are related to the larger trend toward use of the trust as
an organizing device for the professional management of financial as219
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 107 cmts. b–c (1959); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 37 cmt. e(1) (2003); 2 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 5, § 107, at
108–09.
220
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 107 cmt. f (1959); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 37 cmt. f (2003); 2 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 5, § 107.1, at 117–18;
cf. English, supra note 204, at 197–99 (discussing removal under the UTC in situations
“where the personal link between the settlor and trustee has been broken”).
221
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 107 cmt. g (1959); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 37 cmt. f (2003); 2 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 5, § 107.1, at 118.
222
See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 8, at 632–33, 637–39; see also supra note 57.
223
See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
224
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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sets. With these changes, fiduciary law has replaced limited trustee
powers as the beneficiaries’ chief protective device.225 Although modern trustees can, and in fact often should, delegate to specialists,226
the trustee remains ultimately responsible for the exercise of the
broader discretion afforded by modern law. This means that not only
has the potential for managerial agency costs increased, but the importance of removal as a check on these costs has likewise increased.
Consistent with this analysis, anecdotal evidence suggests that
modern settlors regularly contract out of the default removal rules in
favor of easier substitution of trustees,227 sometimes even authorizing
a third-party (the so-called trust protector) to replace the trustee.228
Consider also the analogy to the robust econometric evidence regarding the negative impact on shareholder welfare of corporate takeover
defenses such as classified boards.229 Putting aside concern about the
effect of deterring the settling of trusts in the first place, this analogy
lends support to the view that reducing the threshold for the removal
of trustees should improve beneficiary welfare.
The foregoing therefore provides an argument in favor of the
somewhat more liberal removal standards stated in the new Uniform
Trust Code and Restatement (Third) of Trusts.230 The argument is particularly strong with respect to removal of large (as compared to bou225
See Langbein, supra note 8, at 640–43; Langbein, supra note 59, at 71; see also Alexander, supra note 24, at 775 (arguing that the rise of institutional trustees required “trustinducing mechanisms” such as fiduciary law); Jones, supra note 187, at 121–23 (noting the
historically limited powers of trustees).
226
See supra note 91.
227
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 34 cmt. c (2003) (“It is also common
for the terms of trusts to provide for the appointment of new trustees.”); AM. JUR., Legal
Forms—Trusts §§ 251:370–251:373, 251:388 (2d ed. 2001); JOHN R. PRICE, PRICE ON CONTEMPORARY ESTATE PLANNING § 10.41, at 1152 (2d ed. 2000). In correspondence with the
author about an earlier draft of this Article, Jeffrey Schoenblum observed that the beneficiaries are commonly given authority to replace the trustee with another, provided that the
substitute is also independent. See, e.g., 7 JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, PAGE ON THE LAW OF
WILLS 497–98 (2d. ed. 2000). This limitation is important not only to maintain the broad
structure of the settlor’s plan, but also to avoid a finding under agency law that the trustee
is an agent of the beneficiaries. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 14, cmt. c, 14B,
cmt. c (1958).
228
See discussion infra Part IV.B.4.
229
See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered
Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002) (finding that staggered
boards have a negative impact on shareholder welfare); Robert M. Daines, Do Classified
Boards Affect Firm Value? Takeover Defenses After the Poison Pill (2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Cornell Law Review) (same).
230
See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706, 7C U.L.A. 194–95 (Supp. 2003); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 37 & cmt. e (2003); English, supra note 98, at 28 (noting that the
UTC provisions on trustee removal were “among the more significant” deviations from
traditional doctrine); English, supra note 204, at 197–99; Langbein, supra note 59, at 76
(noting that the UTC “responds to the concern that under traditional law beneficiaries
have had little recourse when trustee performance has been indifferent, but not so egregious as to be in breach of trust”).
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tique) institutional fiduciaries.231 Unlike an individual with whom the
settlor might have had a personal connection, one institutional fiduciary is unlikely to have a comparative advantage over another in effecting the settlor’s intent, especially after a corporate reorganization or
turnover in the company’s account managers.232 This is not to suggest that reputational concerns, particularly with respect to large
banks and trust companies, do not militate toward fidelity. Rather,
the point is that making it easier, at least as a default matter, for beneficiaries to substitute one institution for another might help create an
ex post competition between institutional fiduciaries for trust control
that would complement the current ex ante competition for selection
by the settlor.233
3. Settlor Standing
The question of settlor standing to enforce the terms of the trust
provides a further example of the settlor-beneficiary tension. Traditionally, because the creation of a trust was viewed as a conveyance of
property after which the settlor had no further legal interest, courts
held that only beneficiaries had standing to bring an action against
the trustee for breach in an irrevocable trust.234 As a policy matter,
this rule plausibly follows from the position of the beneficiaries as
residual claimants; certainly it mirrors the similar approach in other
organizational forms, most obviously the corporation.235 Once the
settlor establishes the trust, neither she nor any other non-beneficiary
has a tangible stake in enforcing its terms. The beneficiaries, in contrast, bear the marginal costs and benefits of the trustees’ decision231
See Chester & Ziomek, supra note 20, at 247 (analyzing “the problem of beneficiary
removal of a corporate trustee”).
232
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 37 cmt. f (2003) (“[D]eference . . . may no
longer be justified if, after being designated, a corporate trustee undergoes a significant
structural change, such as by merger.”); Chester & Ziomek, supra note 20, at 274; see also
PRICE, supra note 227, § 10.43.1, at 1161–62 (describing trust management by corporate
trustees).
233
Cf. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 28, at 661 (considering whether beneficiaries should be permitted to change trustees under certain circumstances). Note, however, that this approach would further burden the fiduciary apparatus that protects future
beneficiaries from excessive favoring of the current beneficiaries. See discussion supra Part
IV.A.1.
234
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 200 (1959); 3 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note
5, §§ 200–200.1, at 207–12; Langbein, supra note 8, at 664. See generally John T. Gaubatz,
Grantor Enforcement of Trusts: Standing in One Private Law Setting, 62 N.C. L. REV. 905 (1984)
(discussing instances where courts allow settlors to maintain an action to enforce a trust);
Note, Right of a Settlor to Enforce a Private Trust, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1370 (1949) (arguing that a
settlor’s remedial rights should include the right to bring suit against the trustee).
235
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, § 9.2, at 410–18; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note
1, at 36–38; Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 23
(1991).
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making. Accordingly, it is the beneficiaries who have an incentive to
bring litigation only when it is cost justified, provided that there is at
least one competent beneficiary and his stake is large enough to
counter the problem of collective action.236
But this analysis is too simple. The rule’s origin in the property
law, conveyance-based conception of the trust has obscured the relevance of the parties’ probable intent. Thus, because he believes that
most settlors would prefer to retain the right to bring enforcement
actions against the trustee, Langbein argues that the underlying default rule should be reversed in favor of settlor standing in the absence of a contrary instruction in the trust instrument.237 There are,
however, two further relevant considerations, the second of which is
most clearly brought into view by the agency-costs approach and its
nexus of contracts analogy.
First, because of an exogenous tax consideration, this is a question on which evidence of the actual bargains struck by settlors and
trustees is not necessarily indicative of their preferences. Under current doctrine, the settlor must retain some sort of beneficial interest
in the trust in order to have standing to sue.238 But doing so would
likely subject the trust to undesirable tax consequences.239 This
means that the general failure by settlors in practice to retain standing
rights is not good evidence of their preferences. In particular, this
failure does not prove that increased trustee commissions, which such
standing would likely prompt, have deterred settlors from retaining a
beneficial interest. In fact, the proliferation of the trust protector,
which will be discussed below, is evidence to the contrary.
236

See Gordon, supra note 12, at 76–79 (discussing beneficiary free-rider problems).
Langbein, supra note 8, at 664; see also Hayton, supra note 20, at 103–07 (discussing
settlors as trust enforcers). A similar analysis might apply to the question of whether the
settlor of an inter vivos trust has the power to revoke or to amend the trust in the absence
of express authority in the trust instrument to do so. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 602, 7C
U.L.A. 182–83 (Supp. 2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 63 & cmt. b (2003);
Halbach, supra note 8, at 1898–99; Langbein, supra note 59, at 70–71. There is also overlap
with the question of standing under the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act,
7A U.L.A. 485 (1999), which is currently being revised.
238
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 200 cmt. b (1959); 3 SCOTT ON TRUSTS,
supra note 5, § 200.1, at 211–12.
239
See I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2038 (2001); GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 145, at 516 & n.16
(6th ed. 1987). In correspondence with the author, Joel Dobris suggested that another way
to look at the question is to ask whether a narrowly crafted power to enforce state law
fiduciary duties would qualify as a string under I.R.C. sections 2036 and 2038. Note also
that recent authorities suggest that a reservation of power to replace a trustee would not
trigger liability under sections 2036 or 2038. See Estate of Wall v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. 300
(1993); IRS Rev. Rul. 95-58. If stable, this might provide an alternative means to achieve
the benefits of settlor standing without the tax risk. See Michael Houston, Estate of Wall v.
Commissioner: An Answer to the Problem of Settlor Standing in Trust Law? (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Cornell Law Review).
237
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Second, the agency cost implications of settlor standing are not as
obvious as suggested at the outset of this subsection. True, it is possible that settlor standing would increase agency costs by introducing a
second master over the trustee: “[A] manager told to serve two masters . . . has been freed of both and is answerable to neither.”240 This
is the usual argument in the corporate law discourse against allowing
managers to justify their decisions by reference to the welfare of any
constituency other than shareholders.241 And this objection might
have particular salience in the trust context, because the fear of litigation with parties other than the beneficiaries might further inhibit already overly cautious trustees. After all, an important rationale for the
recent reforms to the standards of prudent investing was to encourage
trustees to be less conservative.242
On the other hand, the donative settlor’s motivation for interposing a trustee between the trust assets and the beneficiary, tax considerations aside, is often a lack of faith in the beneficiaries’ judgment.
Given the likelihood of feckless, unborn, minor, unidentifiable, or
otherwise incompetent beneficiaries,243 and given the possibility of a
free-rider problem among the beneficiaries,244 settlor standing might
minimize agency costs by making the threat of litigation more viable
as a deterrent against actions by the trustee that are not in the best
interests of the beneficiaries or that breach a contrary instruction of
the settlor. Many trust beneficiaries, as other commentators have
noted, are not particularly effective monitors,245 and even when they
are, their preferences are not necessarily congruent with the settlor’s.
The foregoing analysis therefore contributes to Langbein’s discussion by highlighting the importance of two inquiries: first, whose
240

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 38.
See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, § 9.2, at 414–17; Macey, supra note 235, at 31–36.
242
See, e.g., Halbach, Trust Investment, supra note 147, at 407, 411–14; Langbein, The
Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra note 91, at 641–42; supra note 176 and accompanying
text.
243
The doctrine of virtual representation and the appointment of a guardian ad litem
are at best partial solutions. Guardians ad litem are often highly inflexible. See, e.g., Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen & Heilbronner, 612 So. 2d 1378, 1379 n.1 (Fla.
1993) (noting the rigidity of the guardian ad litem’s decisionmaking); see also UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 305(c) & cmt., 7C U.L.A. 154 (Supp. 2003) (stating a more liberal rule of representation); Martin D. Begleiter, The Guardian Ad Litem in Estate Proceedings, 20 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 643 (1984). The doctrine of virtual representation requires an alignment of interests
across generations. See, e.g., N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 315(4) (McKinney 1994); In re
Wolcott, 56 A.2d 641 (N.H. 1948); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1–403(2)(iii), 8 U.L.A. 69
(1998); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 304, 7C U.L.A. 153 (Supp. 2003); Lawrence B. Rodman &
Leroy E. Rodman, Virtual Representation: Some Possible Extensions, 6 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
281, 281–82 (1971). See generally VOLLMAR ET AL., supra note 101, at 345–47 (discussing
guardians ad litem and virtual representation).
244
See discussion infra Part IV.D.1.
245
See, e.g., Fischel & Langbein, supra note 152, at 1114–15, 1118–19; Gordon, supra
note 12, at 82.
241
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claim the settlor would be permitted to advance, and second, whether
the settlor’s approval of an action would insulate the trustee from a
later suit by the beneficiaries (or a beneficiary’s guardian ad litem).246
These questions are specific manifestations of the larger issue of determining whether the settlor is, or the beneficiaries are, the trustee’s
dominant principal. If the aim of trust law were simply to maximize
the welfare of the beneficiaries, then settlor standing should be qualified so as to require that any claim brought by the settlor be resolved
from the perspective of the beneficiaries. Our model of the trust,
however, is one in which the trustee should maximize the welfare of
the beneficiaries subject to the initial constraints of the settlor. Under
this approach, recognition of unqualified settlor standing could reduce two very different types of agency costs.
First, returning again to the exemplary trust discussed above,
which S settled for the benefit of B1 and B2 with T as trustee, T is
more likely to act appropriately if S, in addition to B1 and B2, had
standing to sue. Here S’s standing would provide a backstop check on
managerial agency costs. Second, if S had standing to sue, T would be
less likely to enter into a side bargain with the Bs to avoid the ex ante
constraints imposed by S. For example, the Bs might offer to pay T to
disburse the corpus of the trust. This would raise no duties of loyalty
or impartiality problems if B1 and B2 were competent adults who
agreed to the transaction.247 In this scenario, S’s standing would help
ensure that T respects S’s limitations on the use of the trust funds.248

246

For a complementary doctrinal analysis, see Hayton, supra note 20, at 103–05.
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
248
Given the lack of identifiable beneficiaries in charitable trusts, the foregoing analysis may be relevant to the ongoing debate over donor standing in that context as well. See
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(c), 7C U.L.A. 160 (Supp. 2003); Ronald Chester, Grantor Standing
to Enforce Charitable Transfers Under Section 405(C) of the Uniform Trust Code and Related Law:
How Important Is It and How Extensive Should It Be?, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 611, 628–29
(2003); English, supra note 204, at 180; Paula Kilcoyne, Note, Donor Standing Under the
Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act in Light of Carl J. Herzog Foundation, Inc. v.
University of Bridgeport, 21 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 131, 147–48 (1999); see also Ilana H.
Eisenstein, Comment, Keeping Charity in Charitable Trust Law: The Barnes Foundation and the
Case for Consideration of Public Interest in Administration of Charitable Trusts, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
1747 (2003) (arguing that charitable trust law would benefit from consideration of public
interest); Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497,
606–11 (1981) (advocating for patron enforcement against nonprofit corporations); Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999 WIS. L. REV.
227 (advocating the creation of for-profit monitoring companies to reduce the agency
costs associated with oversight of nonprofit charitable organizations); Symposium, The
Bishop Estate Controversy, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 353 (1999) (discussing the problems associated
with the Bishop estate charitable trust).
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4. Trust Protectors
An emerging feature of modern managerial trusts is the appointment of a trust “protector.”249 To return again to the exemplary trust,
which S settled for the benefit of B1 and B2 with T as trustee, S might
also name her trusted friend P as the trust protector, frequently an
uncompensated position. Among other things, P might be granted
the authority to replace T, to approve modifications to the trust terms
because of developments in the tax law or changes in the Bs’ welfare,
and otherwise to make the sort of decisions with respect to the trust’s
management that S would have made if S had been able.250 Although
originally conceived as a check on local trustees in offshore asset-protection trusts,251 the trust protector has today migrated into ordinary
trusts, an unsurprising result in light of the protector’s usefulness in
minimizing agency costs.
Putting aside the doctrinal question of when, if ever, protectors
should be held to stand in a fiduciary relationship with the beneficiaries,252 the ability of the protector to check agency costs is relatively
straightforward. An office of the trust protector allows the settlor to
appoint a trusted friend or confidant to monitor the trustee’s management.253 Thus, for all the reasons that settlor standing might reduce
agency costs, the appointment of a trust protector might similarly re249
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 64 rep. note cmts. b–d (2003); James L.
Dam, More Estate Planners Are Using ‘Trust Protectors’, LAW. WKLY. U.S.A. (Oct. 29, 2001), at
14, 14; William A. Ensing, Using a Trust Protector in Asset Protection Planning, in ASSET PROTECTION STRATEGIES: PLANNING WITH DOMESTIC AND OFFSHORE ENTITIES 87, 88 (Alexander A.
Bove, Jr. ed., 2002); Hayton, supra note 116, at 579–90; see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 55–1B–1(2) (defining “trust protector”) (Michie 2001); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(c) &
cmt., 7C U.L.A. 207 (Supp. 2003) (discussing trust protectors); Donovan W. M. Waters, The
Protector: New Wine in Old Bottles?, in TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAW 63, 66, 104–05
(A. J. Oakley ed., 1996) (discussing the increased use of trust protectors). A related phenomenon is the so-called “letter of wishes,” on which see Antony G.D. Duckworth, The
Trust Offshore, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 879, 910 (1999); David Hayton, The Irreducible Core
Content of Trusteeship, in TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAW 47, 52–53 & n.35 (A.J.
Oakley ed., 1996); see also JAMES WADHAM, WILLOUGHBY’S MISPLACED TRUST 141–54 (2d ed.
2002) (discussing protectors and letters of wishes).
250
See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55–1B–6 (Michie 2001) (listing potential trust protector powers); Dam, supra note 249, at 23 (same); Hayton, supra note 116, at 583–84
(same); see also Halbach, supra note 8, at 1916–17 (considering how American trust law will
receive trust protectors). See generally Antony Duckworth, Protectors—Fish or Fowl? Part I, 4 J.
INT’L TR. & CORP. PLAN. 131 (1995) (discussing the various powers that protectors may
exercise); Antony Duckworth, Protectors—Fish or Fowl? Part II, 5 J. INT’L TR. & CORP. PLAN.
18 (1996) (discussing the administrative powers of trust protectors); Paul Matthews, Protectors: Two Cases, Twenty Questions, 9 TOLLY’S TR. L. INT’L 108 (1995) (suggesting that the role
of trust protectors be considered from a power-based perspective).
251
Not surprisingly, offshore jurisdictions typically require the appointment of a local
trustee, and doing so is critical to avoiding the jurisdiction of mainland courts. See Sterk,
supra note 11, at 1089–1104; FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).
252
On this question, which is beyond the scope of this Article, see, for example, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 64 rep. note cmts. b–d (2003); Waters, supra note 249.
253
See Waters, supra note 249, at 63.
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duce agency costs. Unlike settlor standing, however, it does not trigger undesirable tax consequences and it continues to function even
after the settlor’s death.
True, an appointment of a trust protector opens the door to new
sources of agency costs—the settlor-protector and the beneficiariesprotector relationships. But the net reduction in agency costs is likely
to outweigh these costs. By giving the protector the authority to replace the trustee, but not appointing the protector to be the trustee,
the settlor is freed to appoint a trusted and loyal friend as the protector even if this friend otherwise lacks the administrative or portfolio
management skills necessary to be a good trustee or co-trustee.254
Moreover, by giving the protector the power to select her successor,
the office of the protector will continue to be occupied by persons
connected to the settlor (albeit those connections become more attenuated over time). This is especially important in light of the erosion of the Rule Against Perpetuities and the emergence of so-called
perpetual trusts.255
The broader point is that the emergence of trust protectors is a
response to the settlor’s uncertainty about the future. Like powers of
appointment,256 a trust protector can be used to build flexibility into a
trust.
C. Internal Governance and External Transactional Authority
By including creditors within its scope, the agency costs model of
the trust as an organizational form highlights the interrelationship between internal governance and the scope of the authority of insiders
to transact with outsiders. The agency cost considerations relevant to
the substantive content of the rules of internal trust governance are a
function of the scope of the authority of the principal parties to transact with outsiders. Similarly, the extent to which the trust insiders
might safely be granted authority to transact over trust assets with outsiders is a function of the effectiveness of the internal governance
structure.257 Thus the agency costs approach to the trust advanced in
this Article should not be understood as embracing the sort of con254
The evolution of the protector might thus be understood as falling within the
framework of Langbein’s predicted “fractionation of trusteeship.” See Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra note 91, at 665–66.
255
See sources cited supra notes 11, 188.
256
See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 299 (2d rev. ed. 1992); Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 11, at 1331–33.
257
Thus, just as one would not study the rules of an agent’s (legally defined) authority
to bind the principal without reference to the effectiveness of the governance devices provided by the law of agency (and vice versa), one should not study the rules of the external
relations of the principal parties with respect to trust property without reference to the
rules of internal trust governance (and vice versa).
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tractarian nihilism that leads to the conclusion that organizations
have no boundaries.258 On the contrary, the approach recognizes
that the existence of boundaries and asset partitioning (i.e., the de
facto separate legal entity of the trust or its equivalent—the trustee as
trustee) are crucial features of trust law.259
This section advances the claim that the rules of internal governance are necessarily intertwined with the rules of external relations.
Any change in one set of rules will have a ripple effect on the terms to
which the relevant parties would have agreed concerning the other.
Accordingly, agency cost analysis of trust law speaks not only to matters of internal governance and external relations, but it also brings
into view the interrelationship between the two.
1. Equitable Tracing
Perhaps the best example of the interrelationship between internal governance and external transactional authority is the principle of
equitable tracing. Under standard doctrine, beneficiaries may assert
an equitable lien on property transferred by the trustee to a thirdparty in breach of trust, provided that the transferee is not a bona fide
purchaser for value without notice.260 Recourse for a broken contract, however, does not normally include a suit against the outsider
who benefited by the breach.261 Hence there is tension between this
doctrine and the notion of the trust as a third-party beneficiary contract. Langbein’s response, in addition to concluding that the trust is
a hybrid of contract and property,262 is to characterize the rule as embodying “a judgment about how far to impinge on outsiders to the
trust deal between settlor and trustee in order to vindicate that
deal.”263
In contrast, there is no tension between this doctrine and the
agency costs model of the trust as an organizational form. By including those who deal with the trustee in the relevant set or nexus of
258
See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 311 (contending that “it makes little or
no sense to try to distinguish those things which are ‘inside’ the firm (or any other organization) from those things that are ‘outside’ of it”).
259
See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 6, at 438.
260
See, e.g., Kline v. Orebaugh, 519 P.2d 691, 696 (Kan. 1974) (discussing the rule of
equitable tracing); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 283–295 (1959). See generally 4
SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 5, §§ 283–95 (discussing liabilities of third parties).
261
The qualification is for fraudulent conveyances, see UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
ACT, 7A U.L.A. 6 (1999); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, 7A U.L.A. 274 (1999), and for
tortious interference with a contract, see Speakers of Sport, Inc. v. Proserv, Inc., 178 F.3d
862, 865–66 (7th Cir. 1999); Fred S. McChesney, Tortious Interference with Contract Versus
“Efficient” Breach: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 28 J. LEG. STUD. 131, 164–66 (1999).
262
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
263
Langbein, supra note 8, at 647–48; see also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 31,
at 378–79 (discussing contract and property rights as imposing distinct sets of liabilities on
outsiders).
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relationships, the rule of equitable tracing appears to reflect the parties’ presumed intent in light of the comparative advantage of the outsider to bear the agency costs associated with this particular potential
breach by the trustee. Thus, even though Hansmann and Mattei regard the default rules of internal trust governance as “relatively unimportant” when compared with the rules that control the relations of
the principal parties with outsiders,264 their explanation of equitable
tracing likewise acknowledges the interrelationship between external
relations and internal governance: When “the rule [of equitable tracing] operates, the third party transferee is almost by definition a
lower-cost monitor of the [trustee’s] breach of duty than is the [beneficiary].”265 In the absence of a contrary agreement, efficiency militates toward allocating this risk to the outsider rather than increasing
the burden on the trust’s internal governance devices.266
This analysis not only provides a functional explanation for equitable tracing as a positive matter, but it also brings into view pertinent
normative considerations for trust law reform. Recognition of the interrelationship between internal governance and the scope of external transactional authority reveals that the price for relaxing one is an
increase in the problems associated with the other. Recognition of
this tradeoff offers a means of ascertaining the costs and benefits of
law reform on the margins of this issue.
Recent efforts to liberalize the rules that govern the dealings with
third parties of the trustee as trustee provide a concrete example.267
The foregoing analysis suggests that the price for enlarging the trustee’s transactional authority will be an increase in potential agency
costs and so a greater burden on the trust’s internal governance devices. Thus, when David English, the Reporter for the Uniform Trust
Code, wrote that “beneficiaries are helped more by the free flow of
commerce than they were by the largely ineffective protective features
of former law,”268 he was in effect arguing that increasing the value of
property held in trust by expanding the trustee’s transactional opportunities (the benefit of this reform) outweighs the minimal increase in

264

Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 6, at 438; see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 6, at 464.
266
Cf. Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in
Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 83, 94–95 (1977) (analyzing the relative
abilities of various parties to foresee, bear, and insure against risk).
267
UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 1010–13, 7C U.L.A. 227–31 (Supp. 2003). These provisions,
which are based on similar provisions in the 1969 Uniform Probate Code and the Uniform
Trustee Powers Act, are the culmination of a decades-long process of statutory reform. See
English, supra note 204, at 144–49 (outlining the history of the Code and its relation to
other uniform acts).
268
See English, supra note 204, at 209.
265
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the burden on the trust’s governance regime (the cost of this
reform).269
2. The Spendthrift Trust
The spendthrift trust provides another example of the importance of the interrelationship between internal governance and the
scope of the principal parties’ external transactional authority.
Spendthrift trusts, in comparison to ordinary trusts, shield the trust’s
assets from the beneficiaries’ creditors.270 This is true even if the trust
instrument requires mandatory payouts, as such payments could be
made directly to the beneficiaries’ service providers.271 Not surprisingly, there is a substantial body of literature on the soundness of the
policy behind the spendthrift trust.272 There is also considerable divergence among the common law nations on the enforcement of
spendthrift provisions. The majority of common law countries, most
prominently England,273 do not enforce them. In contrast, spendthrift provisions are valid throughout the United States,274 are included in customary American estate planning boilerplate,275 and by
statute the spendthrift trust is even the default trust form in New
York.276
The existing normative commentary on the spendthrift trust
tends to present a tradeoff between paternalistic protection of feckless
269
See id. at 208–11. This is consistent with the move away from controlling trustees
through limited powers and toward the fiduciary obligation as the trust’s chief governance
device. See Langbein, supra note 8, at 640–43; text accompanying supra notes 57–59.
270
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS §§ 152–53 (1959); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502, 7C U.L.A. 175 (Supp. 2003). State law
restrictions on transfer are applicable in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). A few
privileged creditors, however, including children, spouses, and former spouses seeking
support or maintenance, may sometimes reach the beneficiaries’ interest despite a spendthrift clause. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59 (2003); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503,
7C U.L.A. 176 (Supp. 2003); Carolyn L. Dessin, Feed a Trust and Starve a Child: The Effectiveness of Trust Protective Techniques Against Claims for Support and Alimony, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
691, 699–720 (1994).
271
Cf. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 28, at 647 (noting circumstances under
which the trustee might pay third parties directly “for the support of the beneficiary”).
272
See, e.g., JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY (1883);
ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS: RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF EQUITABLE
INTERESTS IMPOSED BY THE TERMS OF THE TRUST OR BY STATUTE (1936); Robert T. Danforth,
Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 287, 291–306 (2002); Anne
S. Emanuel, Spendthrift Trusts: It’s Time to Codify the Compromise, 72 NEB. L. REV. 179 (1993);
Fellows, supra note 86; Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and
Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1995); Alan Newman, The Rights of Creditors of
Beneficiaries Under the Uniform Trust Code: An Examination of the Compromise, 69 TENN. L. REV.
771, 782–803 (2002).
273
The classic English case is Brandon v. Robinson, 34 Eng. Rep. 379 (Ch. 1811). For
further discussion and references, see MOFFAT ET AL., supra note 20, at 211–24.
274
See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 28, at 632.
275
See Hirsch, supra note 272, at 3 & n.7.
276
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7–1.5 (McKinney 2002).
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beneficiaries on the one hand and the protection of voluntary and,
more clearly, involuntary creditors on the other.277 The usual focus,
in other words, is on the soundness of limiting the scope of the beneficiaries’ external transactional authority in view of how this limitation
impacts both the beneficiaries and the outsiders with whom the beneficiaries might transact. This approach, however, overlooks the interrelationship between the ability of the trust insiders to transact with
third parties and the details of the trust’s internal governance regime.
One governance benefit of enforcing spendthrift provisions is
that payouts may safely be made mandatory. This reduces the trustee’s discretion and so diminishes the potential for managerial agency
costs. But the cost is that a potential check on agency costs—the theoretical possibility of the residual claimants’ exit—is foreclosed as a
matter of law. Although exit is, in theory, a powerful governance device, in practice its potential has not been realized in the context of
donative trusts because there is no well-developed market for trust
residual interests.278 Such a market, however, would provide price signals about the quality of the particular trust’s management. Unlike
the initial gratuitous transfer by the settlor, a subsequent sale by the
beneficiary of her interest would indeed involve reckoning a price.279
Moreover, alienable residual claims offer the possibility of welfare-improving secondary transactions. For example, if in the hands
of the beneficiary the discounted present value of the future income
stream from the trust is worth $10, but in the hands of someone who
is more adept at monitoring and at fiduciary litigation the present
value of the beneficiary’s interest would be $15, then a spendthrift
provision results in a $5 residual loss. This is the agency costs price of
honoring the settlor’s dead-hand interest in disabling the beneficiary
from alienating her interest.280
In the absence of spendthrift recognition, settlors who wish to
guard the trust’s assets against an insolvent beneficiary’s creditors
277
See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 113, § 18.7, at 523–24; Emanuel, supra note 272, at
186–94; Hirsch, supra note 272, at 44–56; Ogus, supra note 3, at 217–18.
278
Perhaps this is a consequence of the frequency of spendthrift, discretionary, and
protective provisions. Indeed, the availability of the latter two also helps to explain the
narrowness of the corresponding English market notwithstanding the unenforceability of
spendthrift clauses in England. See supra note 273 and accompanying text; infra notes
281–82 and accompanying text.
279
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 81, at 274–77; Fama, supra note 1, at 292;
Fama & Jensen, Separation, supra note 1, at 312–15; cf. Robert D. Hershey Jr., Birthrights Up
for Auction as Investments in London, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1978, at D1 (reporting on the English auction market in reversionary interests); see supra notes 118–23 and accompanying
text.
280
The settlor, in other words, must have figured that the beneficiary would alienate
her interest for less than $10 if given the chance to do so. As Richard Posner has aptly
remarked, such “[t]rusts are based on mistrust.” POSNER, supra note 113, § 18.7, at 524.
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would be channeled, as they are in England,281 toward discretionary
trusts.282 Discretionary trusts are common in American practice too,
but American settlors who are concerned about a beneficiary’s future
insolvency also have the spendthrift alternative. At any rate, because
discretionary trusts leave the payment decision to the discretion of the
trustee, neither the beneficiary nor her creditors have a right to a payout.283 The cost of this alternative disabling restraint is that the internal governance regime, primarily the fiduciary obligation, is further
burdened with the task of regulating the trustees’ exercise of this discretion over disbursements.284 Since the remedy for an underpayment is merely an order that the payments out of the trust be
increased,285 but the remedy for an overpayment is to surcharge the
trustee personally for the excess amounts disbursed,286 trustees are
skewed toward caution.287 Moreover, as there is no guarantee of future payment, it is difficult for beneficiaries to sell their interests.
Thus discretionary trusts, like spendthrifts, do not allow for exit.
These differing routes to giving effect to the settlor’s interest in
limiting the right of a beneficiary to alienate her interest in the trust—
a mandatory trust with a spendthrift limitation versus a discretionary
281
See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 6, at 452 n.57; Halbach, supra note 8, at
1893–96.
282
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155 (1959); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504,
7C U.L.A. 177 (Supp. 2003); Evelyn Ginsberg Abravanel, Discretionary Support Trusts, 68
IOWA L. REV. 273, 277–80 (1983); Newman, supra note 272, at 803–17. Yet another alternative, also common in England, is a trust with a “protective provision”—a clause that conditions the beneficiary’s interest on her solvency or the nonoccurrence of any event that, but
for the protective provision, would have allowed a third party to reach the beneficiary’s
interest. See TRUSTEE ACT 1925 § 33 (Eng.); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 57 (2003);
BOGERT, supra note 239, § 44; TODD & WILSON, supra note 20, § 2.6, at 74–75; Hayton, supra
note 116, at 590–92; Ogus, supra note 3, at 205; see also Emanuel, supra note 272, at 185–88
(discussing protective clauses and discretionary trusts).
283
See, e.g., Goforth v. Gee, 975 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Ky. 1998); United States v.
O’Shaughnessy, 517 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Minn. 1994); Hamilton v. Drogo, 150 N.E. 496, 497
(N.Y. 1926); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155 & cmt. b (1959); UNIF. TRUST CODE
§ 504(b), 7 U.L.A. 177 (Supp. 2003); 2A SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 5, § 155.1, at 159–64;
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 cmt. e (2003) (explaining when creditors can
compel distribution).
284
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 (2003); Edward C. Halbach, Jr.,
Problems of Discretion in Discretionary Trusts, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1426–27 (1961).
285
See Kolodney v. Kolodney, 503 A.2d 625, 628 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986); In re Estate of
Lindgren, 885 P.2d 1280, 1283 (Mont. 1994); WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. & SHELDON F.
KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES § 9.5, at 339–40 (2001); Halbach, supra note 284, at
1427.
286
See Feibelman v. Worthen Nat’l Bank, 20 F.3d 835, 836–37 (8th Cir. 1994); In re
Murray, 45 A.2d 636, 639 (Me. 1946); Austin v. U.S. Bank of Wash., 869 P.2d 404, 415
(Wash. App. 1994); MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 285, § 9.5, at 339–40; Halbach, supra
note 284, at 1427.
287
A further (albeit illegitimate) reason for trustee conservatism is that fees are often a
percentage of the trust corpus, though this schedule based approach is now giving way to a
reasonableness standard. See supra note 172.
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trust—present different agency costs consequences. It is not obvious
that disapproval of the spendthrift trust either decreases agency costs
or improves the position of the beneficiaries’ creditors (though creditors of discretionary trust beneficiaries have leverage that creditors of
spendthrift trust beneficiaries lack). Perhaps the divergence of opinion among the common law jurisdictions in part reflects the difficulty
in reckoning the magnitudes of the foregoing effects.
Even if it does not help resolve the policy question of which form
of protective measure is preferable, agency cost analysis does help explain the continued existence of one or more of these protective
mechanisms in all common law jurisdictions. Without the option of at
least one enforceable protective measure, settlors who are concerned
about a beneficiary’s future insolvency would be channeled toward informal arrangements, such as outright transfers to trusted kin or
friends with a wink and a nod that the transferee will take care of the
would-be beneficiary.288 The potential agency costs to the beneficiaries and to the settlor of this approach, which would hardly benefit
the beneficiaries’ creditors, are manifest.289
D. Fiduciary Litigation
The possibility of market-based governance devices for the donative trust is limited by the impediments—central to its often paternalistic function—to the beneficiaries’ ability to alienate their stake in
the trust and to their ability to replace the trustee. In today’s trusts, in
which the limits of yore on the trustee’s powers have yielded to broad
grants of discretion, this places much of the governance burden on
the fiduciary obligation.290 It is here that the agency costs approach
to the trust most closely converges with Langbein’s contractarianism:
both point strongly toward a contractarian, hypothetical-bargain underpinning for the fiduciary obligation.291 Indeed, drawing on earlier
288

See Hirsch, supra note 272, at 70–71.
See id. at 71 & n.264.
290
See Langbein, supra note 8, at 640–43 (discussing the decline of powers law and the
rise of fiduciary law for protecting the interests of the beneficiaries).
291
There is no shortage of commentary on fiduciary duties generally. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 24; William W. Bratton, Game Theory and the Restoration of Honor to Corporate
Law’s Duty of Loyalty, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 139 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995);
Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the AntiContractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990); Brian R. Cheffins, Law, Economics and Morality:
Contracting Out of Corporate Law Fiduciary Duties, 19 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 28 (1991); Robert C.
Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS, supra note 67, at 55;
Cooter & Freedman, supra note 69; Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of
Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 173; Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209 (1995); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary
Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795 (1983); Oliver Hart, An Economist’s View of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U.
TORONTO L.J. 299 (1993); Larry E. Ribstein, The Structure of the Fiduciary Relationship
(Oct. 11, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Cornell Law Review); L.S. Sealy,

R

289

R

R

R
R
R

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

\\server05\productn\C\CRN\89-3\CRN302.txt

678

unknown

Seq: 58

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

27-FEB-04

9:29

[Vol. 89:621

economic analyses of the fiduciary relationship more generally,292
Langbein persuasively shows that notwithstanding “pulpit-thumping
rhetoric about the sanctity of fiduciary obligations,”293 the fiduciary
duties imposed by the law of trusts are simply majoritarian default
rules.294
Thus, this section will neither engage the debate over the contractarian basis for trust fiduciary law nor explore the congruence between the structure of the trust law fiduciary obligation and the
agency problems embedded in the private trust (though I have offered some discussion of this earlier in this Article and elsewhere).295
Instead, this section will briefly explore two possible answers to the
question of why the fiduciary obligation appears to have succeeded as
the private trust’s primary check on managerial agency costs.296 The
question is brought into sharp relief by the widely-held view that the
fiduciary obligation has proved to be a less successful governance device in the cognate field of corporate governance.297
Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69; J.C. Shepherd, Towards a Unified Concept of
Fiduciary Relationships, 97 L.Q. REV. 51 (1981); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory
of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399 (2002); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation,
25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1975).
292
See Langbein, supra note 8, at 655–60 (citing Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 173
and Cooter & Freedman, supra note 69); see also Fischel & Langbein, supra note 152, at
1113–17 (describing trust law fiduciary duties from an economic perspective). Alexander
noted this point. See Alexander, supra note 24, at 767–68.
293
Langbein, supra note 8, at 629. This is not to say that moral condemnation does
not have utility as an expressive sanction, especially for institutional fiduciaries for which
reputation is a valuable asset. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 69, at 1073–74; see also
Langbein, supra note 8, at 658 (noting that, “[e]ven though fiduciary duties are contractually assumed, they embody deep moral precepts about the behavior appropriate for a trustee or other fiduciary”); cf. Dan M. Kahan, What do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 591 (1996) (discussing the “expressive dimension of punishment”).
294
“Loyalty and prudence, the norms of trust fiduciary law, embody the default regime
that the parties to the trust deal would choose as the criteria for regulating the trustee’s
behavior in these settings in which it is impractical to foresee precise circumstances and to
specify more exact terms.” Langbein, supra note 8, at 658.
295
See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the duty of impartiality); supra Part IV.A.3 (discussing the duty of care); see also Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 572–74, 579–80 (discussing the duties
of loyalty and disclosure). For further discussion of fiduciary duties informed by agency
theory, see W. Bishop & D.D. Prentice, Some Legal and Economic Aspects of Fiduciary Remuneration, 46 MOD. L. REV. 289 (1983); Cooter & Freedman, supra note 69, at 1047; Easterbrook
& Fischel, supra note 173, at 426–27; Fischel & Langbein, supra note 152, at 1113–17.
296
For a behavioral decision theory approach to this question, see Alexander, supra
note 24.
297
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, § 8.3, at 365–68; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful
Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1985, at 5, 12; John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit:
An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 264–65 (1981);
Fischel & Bradley, supra note 82, 262–63; Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder
Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733, 1735–37 (1994); Roberta Romano, The
Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 84 (1991); see also
Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 570–82 (comparing the governance of public corporations with
that of donative trusts).
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1. Litigation Incentives
When liability rules are the chief check on agency costs, there is a
practical limit to the number of residual claimants that the organization can support. The greater the number, the more serious the collective action dynamic that will weaken any individual’s incentive to
monitor and, if cost justified, to litigate.298 Consider, for example,
that the paradigmatic shareholder in a publicly-traded corporation
has only a trivial stake in the company. So the typical shareholder has
little incentive to reckon the costs and benefits of litigation from the
perspective of all the shareholders. Consequently, in corporate fiduciary litigation the real party in interest is often the lawyer.299
Litigation incentives are likely to be different in the world of donative trusts, however, thanks to the typically smaller number of
residual claimants.300 Donative trust beneficiaries are likely to have a
nontrivial stake when measured either by the fraction of their wealth
held in the trust or the fractional share of the trust to which each is
entitled. Accordingly, fiduciary litigation in trust law is more likely to
be prompted by the merits than in corporate law. The relatively
smaller number of residual claimants and their relatively larger stakes
lessens the impact of the collective action and free-rider dynamics.
Of course, trust beneficiaries do not have perfect litigation incentives. Some beneficiaries lack a sufficient stake to reckon the costs
and benefits of bringing suit.301 Moreover, awards of attorneys’ fees
(out of the trust corpus) to one or both sides in suits over trust administration are not uncommon.302 Even though courts can use this as a
tool to encourage meritorious litigation, reimbursement of attorneys
fees out of the trust might nevertheless encourage strike suits or discourage meritorious claims; the beneficiaries often wind up paying
298

See Gordon, supra note 12, at 76–79.
See ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 10, § 10.2, at 351, 355–57; BAINBRIDGE, supra
note 1, § 8.3, at 367; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 100–02. See generally John C.
Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private
Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986) (noting that plaintiff’s attorneys are often risk-taking entrepreneurs); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991) (proposing reforms to reduce the agency costs that necessarily result where the attorney, not the client,
controls litigation).
300
See Macey, supra note 3, at 319; see also Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3, at 29 n.110
(“Agency costs are probably lower in a trust than in a corporation (or a government),
because its principals are fewer and so have an incentive to monitor.”).
301
See Gordon, supra note 12, at 76–79.
302
See, e.g., Allard v. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 663 P.2d 104, 111–12 (Wash. 1983); UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 1004, 7C U.L.A. 224 (Supp. 2003) (noting that a court may award fees); 3 SCOTT
ON TRUSTS, supra note 5, § 188.4, at 62–69 (discussing trustees’ authority to pay fees out of
the trust corpus); Gordon, supra note 12, at 76–77 n.103 (analyzing when beneficiaries can
recover litigation costs).
299
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the litigation costs for both sides.303 Still, the more modest claim
holds: fiduciary litigation is a viable governance option in trust law
because there are fewer residual claimants and the collective action
pathology is thereby minimized.
A separate objection to relying on liability rules to police trustees
is that beneficiaries are often unsuited to monitor the trustee, perhaps
because they are unborn, incapacitated, or simply irresponsible. After
all, tax exigencies to one side, the settlor did not trust the beneficiaries enough to make an outright transfer, favoring instead a trust
despite its inherent agency costs. Nevertheless, trust fiduciary law, especially the duty of loyalty, is stricter and more prophylactic than the
fiduciary law of other organizational forms.304 Thus, as Fischel and
Langbein have suggested, many of these duties can be understood as
“substitutes for monitoring by the directly interested parties.”305
Moreover, the modern trend is toward further expansion of the duty
to furnish beneficiaries with relevant information regarding the management of the trust.306
This analysis throws light on the relevance of the number of
residual claimants to the choice of organizational form.307 The
agency costs-checking mechanisms of the private trust depend on the
existence of relatively few residual claimants. The corporation, in
contrast, is constructed so that it can—but need not, as shown by the
success of the close corporation—handle many residual claimants.
Unlike the typical close corporation, the trust separates risk bearing
and management; and unlike the public corporation, the trust’s
residual claim is typically split among a small number of claimants.308
303
See generally ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 10, § 10.2, at 351 (noting the role of
attorneys’ fees in prompting litigation); POSNER, supra note 113, § 21.11 (discussing the
economics of the contingent fee system).
304
Consider, for example, the no-further-inquiry rule. For references, see infra note
319. See also discussion supra Part IV.A.3 (comparing the duty of care in trust law and
corporate law).
305
Fischel & Langbein, supra note 152, at 1114. Note the emergence of organizations
such as Heirs, Inc., the purpose of which is to facilitate better monitoring by trust beneficiaries. See http://www.heirs.net/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2003); see also Lewis Beale, An HeirRaising Enterprise, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1992, at E1 (discussing Heirs, Inc. and its founder,
Standish Smith).
306
See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813, 7C U.L.A. 210 (Supp. 2003); Halbach, supra note 8, at
1914–15; see, e.g., Allard v. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 663 P.2d 104, 110–11 (Wash. 1983); Langbein,
supra note 59, at 74 (noting the “trend of the American case law to enhance the disclosure
obligations of trustees regarding major transactions”); Langbein, supra note 98. For further discussion of disclosure in trust law, see Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 579–80.
307
See generally Fama & Jensen, Residual Claims, supra note 1, at 328 (arguing that the
“characteristics of residual claims distinguish” organizational forms).
308
In a loose sense, then, the trust is closer to the Alchian and Demsetz conception of
the firm, which imagines the residual claimant as the chief monitor, see Alchian & Demsetz,
supra note 1, at 782, than it is to the later agency cost models of the public corporation, see,
e.g., Fama, supra note 1, at 289. But the trust is not as close to Alchian and Demsetz’s
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The relevance of the number of residual claimants to the agencycosts-checking utility of the fiduciary obligation is further emphasized
by a quick comparison of the private trust with the statutory business
trust. The chief differences between the two are the frequency with
which statutory business trusts provide voting rights, transferable or at
least redeemable interests, and less rigorous processes for removing
trustees.309 These characteristics make the statutory business trust
look more like a public corporation than a donative trust. Similarly,
the governance of numerous commercial manifestations of the common law private trust, at least when the residual claims are sold to
outsiders, also more closely resembles the governance of the public
corporation than it does the governance of the donative trust.310 It
will therefore be interesting to see whether the ongoing relaxation of
the Rule Against Perpetuities, and the consequent increase in the
number of beneficiaries in donative trusts, will eventually move trust
law toward more of a corporate governance model.311
It also seems likely that this agency costs analysis could be applied
to employee benefit and pension trusts, upon which ERISA imposes a
mandatory trust law paradigm.312 Given the large number of participants in many of these plans, the incentive structure and agency costs
analysis for pension and employee benefits trusts might more closely
resemble that of public corporations than that of the traditional gratuitous private trust. If so, this may explain some of the tension between
the trust law paradigm and the realities of pension and employee benefit trusts in practice.313
model as the close corporation, for which the managers tend also to be the chief residual
claimants. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 85, at 273.
309
See Wendell Fenton & Eric A. Mazie, Delaware Business Trusts, in 2 DELAWARE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS ch. 19 (R. Franklin Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein
eds., 3d ed. Supp. 2004); Tamar Frankel, The Delaware Business Trust Act Failure as the New
Corporate Law, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 325, 325–332 (2001); Schwarcz, supra note 13, at
562–63, 568–69.
310
See Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 562–63, 568–69, 579; Sheldon A. Jones et al., The
Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered Investment Companies, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 421, 430
(1988); see also Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 146–47 (1924) (describing the business trust
as having an ownership form similar to the corporation); Nathan Issacs, Trusteeship in Modern Business, 42 HARV. L. REV. 1048 (1929) (discussing the popularity of the use of the trust
form for business affairs); Langbein, supra note 14, at 179–85 (discussing trust attributes
that invite commercial use of the trust form); Andrew Kopans, The Business Trust in the
Mutual Fund Industry: Old Arguments in a New Industry with Two New Players 2–6 (May
1, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Cornell Law Review).
311
See generally Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 11, at 1339 (noting the potential for
“multiplication of beneficiaries” in perpetual trusts).
312
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (2000);
LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 152, at 646–48.
313
See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 152, at 1107 (arguing that “the central concept
of ERISA fiduciary law, the exclusive benefit rule, misdescribes the reality of the modern
pension and employee benefit trust”); see also John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks
Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 20, 208–209 (criticizing recent Supreme Court ERISA decisions);
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The relevance of the number of residual claimants to the agency
costs calculus is further supported by the widely-held view that the absence of identifiable beneficiaries causes serious problems for charitable trust governance.314
2. Fiduciary Sub-Rules
In other contexts, perhaps the most apposite being the governance of closely-held corporations, it has been suggested that the “usefulness of fiduciary duties as a guide for conduct is limited” by their
open ended nature.315 But the donative trust differs importantly from
the close corporation in that there is less variance in operating context from one trust to another. This relative homogeneity of context
has allowed courts to develop a detailed scheme of fiduciary sub-rules
that serve as specific agency cost-checking devices. In contrast, the law
of close corporations depends instead on the parties’ tailoring an arrangement to their particular circumstances.316 Trust law’s fiduciary
sub-rules include the duties to keep and control trust property, to enforce claims, to defend actions, to keep trust property separate, to
minimize costs (including taxes), to furnish information to the beneficiaries, and so on.317
The function of these sub-rules is to provide the benefits of rules
(as compared to standards) without inviting strategic behavior by trustees.318 When aggrieved beneficiaries can squeeze their claim into a
specific sub-rule—and for these purposes, the ban on self-dealing
known as the no-further-inquiry rule can be included within the analysis319—their case is simplified. As in the application of any rule, the
costs of decision are lower than they are for a standard. When the
aggrieved beneficiaries cannot fit their claim into a specific sub-rule,
however, then the broad standards of care and loyalty serve as a backstop by allowing for a contextual, facts-and-circumstances judicial inquiry into the trustees’ behavior. In such a case, courts serve a gapJohn H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in
Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (2003) (same).
314
See sources cited supra notes 188 & 248; see also Macey, supra note 3, at 315, 319.
315
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 85, at 291.
316
See id. at 281–86.
317
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 172–185 (1959); UNIF. TRUST CODE
§§ 801–13, 7C U.L.A. 200–10 (Supp. 2003).
318
See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking,
3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 258–59 (1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 586–88 (1992); see also MindGames, Inc. v. W. Publ’g Co., 218
F.3d 652, 657–58 (7th Cir. 2000) (comparing rules and standards); Carol M. Rose, Crystals
and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988) (noting that the law shifts back and
forth between hard-edged rules, “crystals,” and softer standards, “mud”).
319
See, e.g., Hartman v. Hartle, 122 A. 615, 615 (N.J. Ch. 1923); 2A SCOTT ON TRUSTS,
supra note 5, § 170.2, at 320. For commentary, see Cooter & Freedman, supra note 69, at
1054–55; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 173, at 437; Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 572–74.
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filling role owing to “the impossibility of writing contracts completely
specifying the parties’ obligations.”320
Recall that in the modern managerial trust, the fiduciary obligation has eclipsed limited powers as the chief device for controlling
managerial agency costs.321 The effectiveness of the trust law fiduciary
obligation as a check on agency costs is enhanced by use of a mix of
sub-rules, which are made possible by the relative homogeneity of
managerial context for donative trusts,322 and overarching
standards.323
CONCLUSION
This Article’s agency costs approach to the donative private trust
not only helps to advance the ongoing debate over whether trust law is
closer to property law or contract law, but also, and more importantly,
it provides a rich positive and normative framework for further economic analysis of trust law. Principal-agent economics has great potential to offer further insights about the nature and function of the
law of trusts. In particular, the agency costs analysis of this Article
demonstrates how and why use of the private trust triggers a temporal
agency problem (whether the trustee will remain loyal to the settlor’s
original wishes) in addition to the usual agency problem that arises
when risk-bearing and management are separated (whether the
trustee-manager will act in the best interests of the beneficiariesresidual claimants).
The agency costs approach offers fresh insights into recurring
problems in trust law including, among others, modification and termination, settlor standing, fiduciary litigation, trust-investment law
and the duty of impartiality, trustee removal, the role of so-called trust
protectors, and spendthrift trusts. The Article’s normative claim is
that the law should minimize the agency costs inherent in locating
managerial authority with the trustee and the residual claim with the
beneficiaries, but only to the extent that doing so is consistent with
the ex ante instructions of the settlor. This qualification gives priority
320

Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 173, at 426.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
322
On the relevance of ex ante programmability to agency costs analysis, see Eisenhardt, supra note 67, at 62.
323
A similar sub-rule phenomenon exists within the law of agency. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 380–86, 388–98 (1958). The detailed rules of legal ethics, see, e.g.,
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1–1.18 (2003); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DRS 5-101–5-107 (1988), might also be understood as a manifestation of this sub-rule
phenomenon. Each of the rules cited here reflects the sort of generic agency cost pattern
that is likely to recur in legal agency relationships on the one hand or attorney-client relationships on the other.
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to the settlor over the beneficiaries as the trustee’s primary principal.
The positive claim is that, at least with respect to traditional doctrines,
the law conforms to the suggested normative approach.
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